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The thesis analyzes the sources of power that underpin political coalitions in 
three districts in North Sumatra in an attempt to explain patterns of local 
political contention. Three basic types of coalitions contend for power in these 
places. Local mafias are powerful when the officials who direct the executive 
office, bureaucratic agencies and the assembly collude to distribute state 
patronage among themselves and their allied business contractors. Party 
machines deploy party resources, legislative power and influence within 
supra-local bureaucracies to dominate local politics. When mafias and 
machines are evenly matched and well-developed social organizations are 
present, one or both sides may attempt to gain an advantage by mobilizing 
previously excluded constituencies. The expanded, mobilizing coalition that 
results has a broader popular base than mafias or machines. The strategies that 
each type of coalition chooses to pursue power are constrained by the 
resources they can summon from the institutions upon which they are based. 
The approach applies in other Indonesian districts to the extent that similar 
sources of power exist in other places. Recent competition among coalitions 
implies that political power in Indonesia is recentralizing even as new 
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Badan Pertanahan Nasional, National Land Tenure 
Board 
District Executive 
Partai Demokrat, Democrat Party 
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In 2010, Indonesia entered its third round of local elections since the 
end of authoritarian rule in 1998 and the passage of decentralization reforms in 
1999. The reforms gave local assemblies (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, 
DPRD) the authority to draft legislation, enact local taxes and deliberate the 
administrative budget, and district executives (Bupati) the right to appoint 
bureaucrats and license some natural resource concessions. In addition, the 
reforms guaranteed local government revenues by providing that the central 
government would annually release block grants to each district and province.1 
Local government, comprised of an assembly and an executive, assumed 
discretionary authority far beyond what it had possessed during Suharto’s New 
Order regime. 
Parallel electoral reform encouraged thousands of candidates across 
Indonesia to compete for local office. The first round of elections from 1999-
2005 was indirect, in that popularly elected district assemblies voted to select 
executives.2 Beginning with the second round in 2005, direct popular elections 
were held to determine district executives.3 These contests have been intensely 
                                                            
1 The reforms were initially formulated in Laws No. 22/1999 and No. 25/1999, and later 
revised in Laws No. 32/2004 and 33/2004. For overviews, see Vedi Hadiz, Localising Power 
in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2010): 63-87; Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken, “Introduction,” in 
Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia, Henk Schulte Nordholt 
and Gerry van Klinken, eds. (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007): 1-29. 
2 Indirect elections were provided for in Laws No. 2/1999, No. 3/1999 and No. 4/1999. For 
overviews, see Hadiz, Localising Power, 63-87; International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: 
Preventing Violence in Local Elections,” Asia Report No. 197, 8 December 2007. 
3 Law No. 32/2004 revised the election procedures. See Michael Buehler, “Decentralisation 
and Local Democracy in Indonesia: The Marginalisation of the Public Sphere,” in Problems of 
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competitive. Some districts and cities have fielded more than 10 candidates for 
the office despite very high costs associated with a successful campaign.4 
Vote-buying and paying bribes to obtain party nominations have been 
commonplace.5 In rare instances, violence, especially against property, has 
marred the process.6 
At the same time that the reforms were being instituted, the number of 
Indonesian districts and provinces exploded because old administrative units 
were subdivided to create new, smaller ones.7 From 1998 to 2004, the total 
number of districts increased from 292 to 434 despite the fact that Indonesia’s 
land area shrank when the United Nations assumed administrative control of 
East Timor in 1999. More recently, district partitioning has continued but at a 
slower rate, so that in 2010 there were 491 Indonesian districts. These 
territorial changes further decentralized Indonesian politics by creating 
hundreds of new bureaucratic agencies and elected offices at the local level. 
New districts, competitive elections and the discretionary powers of 
local government have generated a great deal of scholarly and journalistic 
interest in Indonesia’s local politics. Local government decisions impact 
                                                                                                                                                           
Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society, Edward Aspinall and 
Marcus Mietzner, eds. (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010): 267-285. 
4 At the local level, Indonesia is administratively divided into rural districts (Kabupaten) and 
urban municipalities (Kota). Although Indonesia’s administration has since been simplified, a 
good overview can be found in Michael Malley, “Regions: Centralization and Resistance,” in 
Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition, Donald Emmerson, ed. 
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999): 71-105. For simplicity, I will often use the term “district” 
to refer collectively to kabupaten and kota. 
5 Indonesians refer to these practices as “money politics.” See Syarif Hidayat, “Pilkada, 
Money Politics and the Dangers of ‘Informal Governance’ Practices,” in Deepening 
Democracy in Indonesia? Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada), Maribeth Erb and 
Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, eds. (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009): 125-146. 
6 ICG, “Preventing Violence in Local Elections.” 
7 Pemekaran wilayah is the Indonesian term for forming new districts by subdividing existing 
ones. See Ehito Kimura, “Proliferating provinces: Territorial politics in post-Suharto 
Indonesia,” South East Asia Research 18.3 (2010): 415-449. 
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village development programs, local economies, national party politics and the 
effectiveness of Indonesia’s well-publicized reforms. Who are the local 
politicians who have been given so much influence in Indonesia’s new system, 
and how did they achieve their positions?8 
 
Characterizing Local Power 
The majority of local politicians previously pursued careers in 
business, the bureaucracy, party service or parastatal youth organizations. In a 
survey of 50 local elections in 2005, Marcus Mietzner found that almost two-
thirds of candidates were bureaucrats or entrepreneurs, and that another 
twenty-two percent were party officials.9 Vedi Hadiz affirms a similar 
“political sociology of local elites,” noting that local politics have been 
dominated by bureaucrats, entrepreneurs and “goons and thugs” associated 
with the New Order’s corporatist youth organizations.10 Notably absent are 
military officers, who in post-reform Indonesia rarely win local office.11 
Mietzner calls these politicians members of “the oligarchic elite,”12 and Hadiz 
argues that they “have been able to usurp…reforms…to sustain their social 
and political dominance.”13 They are so well-established, according to 
                                                            
8 A similar question was posed in Henk Schulte Nordholt, “Renegotiating Boundaries: Access, 
agency and identity in post-Suharto Indonesia,” Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 
159 (2003): 572. 
9 Marcus Mietzner, “Local democracy: Old elites are still in power, but direct elections now 
give voters a chance,” Inside Indonesia 85 (Jan-Mar 2006): 17-18. 
10 Hadiz, Localising Power, 92-93. 
11 Michael Malley, “New Rules, Old Structures and the Limits of Democratic 
Decentralisation,” in Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation & 
Democratisation, Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, eds. (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003): 102-116. 
12 Marcus Mietzner, “Indonesia and the pitfalls of low-quality democracy: A case study of the 
gubernatorial elections in North Sulawesi,” in Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia, 
Marco Bunte and Andreas Ufen, eds. (New York: Routledge, 2009): 141. 
13 Hadiz, Localising Power, 3. 
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Michael Buehler, that “the majority of candidates competing in local 
elections…[are] closely affiliated with New Order networks,” and even when 
incumbents lose elections they “have largely been replaced by representatives 
of the same old elite.”14 
According to this view, local elites form cartels comparable to bosses 
in the Philippines or criminal godfathers in Thailand.15 Hadiz calls the 
arrangements “’local strongmen’, corrupt local machineries of power… [and] 
pockets of authoritarianism.”16 Henk Schulte Nordholt chooses the term 
“regional shadow regimes.”17 John Sidel elaborates that “local ‘mafias’, 
‘networks’, and ‘clans,’” which are “loosely defined, somewhat shadowy, and 
rather fluid clusters and cliques of businessman, politicians, and officials” 
govern at the local level in Indonesia.18 
Shadowy mafias may be common, but they are not ubiquitous. A few 
scholars have identified other types of networks that contest local power. 
Buehler, for example, has claimed that “strong personal networks at the sub-
district level” were a necessary condition to winning district office in South 
Sulawesi.19 Claire Smith, meanwhile, has argued that Golkar (Golongan 
Karya, Functional Group), which had been the regime’s electoral vehicle 
                                                            
14 Buehler, “Decentralisation and Local Democracy,” 276. 
15 John Sidel, Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines. (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999); James Ockey, “The Rise of Local Power in Thailand: Provincial 
Crime, Elections and the Bureaucracy,” in Money and Power in Provincial Thailand, Ruth 
McVey, ed. (Singapore: ISEAS, 2000): 74-96. 
16Vedi Hadiz, Localising Power, 3-4. 
17 Henk Schulte Nordholt, “Renegotiating Boundaries,” 579. 
18 John Sidel, “Bossism and Democracy in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia: Towards 
an Alternative Framework for the Study of ‘Local Strongmen’” in Politicising Democracy: 
The New Local Politics of Democratisation, ed. John Harriss, Kristian Stokke and Olle 
Törnquist (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004): 69. 
19 Michael Buehler, “The Rising Importance of Personal Networks in Indonesian Local 
Politics: An Analysis of District Government Head Elections in South Sulawesi in 2005,” in 
Deepening Democracy in Indonesia? Erb and Priyambudi, eds.: 102. 
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during the New Order, operated a party machine in North Maluku, 
notwithstanding the prevailing view that the local influence of political parties 
was in decline.20 
 In addition, the literature on ethnic and religious politics highlights an 
influential group of elites that was excluded from power during the New 
Order. Since the regime collapsed, cultural elites have played pivotal roles, 
both destructive and constructive, in local politics. In some districts, violent 
militias and riotous mobs mobilized around ethnic and religious identities.21 In 
others, ethnic and religious traditions have mediated popular organizing and 
widespread political participation.22 Old aristocracies and royal houses, 
traditional symbols of ethnic leadership, have reemerged during the post-
reform era and attempted to convert their symbolic power into political 
influence.23 
 The literature demonstrates wide variation among politically influential 
local elites. “New Order elites” are not monolithic: they include politicians, 
businessmen, bureaucrats and thugs. Grassroots networks matter in some 
districts, while parties play different roles in different places. Cultural elites 
mobilize their followers to participate in diverse forms of collective action. 
                                                            
20 Compare Claire Smith, “The Return of the Sultan? Patronage, Power, and Political 
Machines in ‘Post’-Conflict North Maluku,” in Deepening Democracy in Indonesia? Erb and 
Priyambudi, eds.: 303-326; Dirk Tomsa, “Uneven party institutionalization, protracted 
transition and the remarkable resilience of Golkar,” in Democratization in Post-Suharto 
Indonesia, Bunte and Ufen, eds.: 176-198. 
21 Jamie Davidson, “Studies of Massive, Collective Violence in Post-Soeharto Indonesia” 
Critical Asian Studies 41.2 (2009): 329-349. 
22 Jamie Davidson and David Henley, eds. The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics: 
The deployment of adat from colonialism to indigenism (New York: Routledge, 2007); Deasy 
Simandjuntak, “Milk Coffee at 10AM: Encountering the State through Pilkada in North 
Sumatra,” in State of Authority: The State in Society in Indonesia, Gerry van Klinken and 
Joshua Barker, eds. (Ithaca: Cornell SEAP, 2009): 73-94. 
23 Gerry van Klinken, “Return of the sultans: The communitarian turn in local politics,” in The 
Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics, Davidson and Henley, eds.: 149-169. 
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Any analysis of local politics after Indonesia’s decentralization reforms must 
account for such variation. Accordingly, the study of local politics must not 
assume that political contenders resemble one another. 
This thesis argues that at least three types of coalitions contend for 
local political power in Indonesia. Each coalition is associated with a 
particular set of institutions that provide the sources of its power. Mafias 
control local state institutions. Machines have the backing of a major political 
party. Mobilizing coalitions seek to mobilize and incorporate previously 
excluded social constituencies. Mobilization as a strategy is available to both 
mafias and machines, but in pursuing it mafias and machines are transformed 
into the third type of coalition. As mobilizing coalitions, they must 
accommodate the expectations of new groups that are neither part of the state 
nor the constituents of political parties. The types of coalitions pursue 
contrasting strategies that are based on the resources available to their 
associated institutions. Finally, political contention among these types of 
coalitions is oriented vertically. Machines are directed from the center, mafias 
encompass local elites and mobilizing coalitions respond to popular pressures. 
The argument draws on evidence from case studies in three districts in 
North Sumatra province.24 In Labuhan Batu district, a well-established mafia 
collapsed into two factions in 2008. During the 2010 district election, the 
breakaway faction mobilized thousands of campaign volunteers to defeat the 
incumbent district executive’s wife at the polls. In Tapanuli Selatan district, 
                                                            
24 Because local coalitions have taken shape within the decentralized institutional 
arrangements of post-reform Indonesia, the case studies examine local political history since 
the end of the New Order. Further study might investigate how deeper historical legacies have 
influenced local power structures.  
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the Golkar party machine waged a political war against an entrenched mafia 
from 2005 to 2010. In 2005, the fierceness of the competition prevented either 
side from winning the district election. But after the district was subdivided 
into three new districts in 2008, the machine won the 2010 election and took 
control of the executive branch. Finally, in Serdang Bedagai district, the 
Golkar machine defeated a local mafia in a close and controversial election in 
2005. Once in office, the new executive reached out to farmers and fisherfolk 
in an effort to mobilize a broad social coalition. The strategy succeeded, and in 
2010, the newly mobilized coalition reelected the machine by the largest 
margin in North Sumatra. 
 Limited as it is to three of Indonesia’s 491 districts and municipalities, 
the case selection does not allow for conclusions that presume general 
explanations.25 Instead, close observation in specific districts contributes to a 
more detailed understanding of the processes that shape local elite coalitions.26 
This kind of analysis clarifies the intervening variables that lead to particular 
outcomes.27 This thesis examines the composition of contending coalitions as 
an intervening variable that modifies the effect of institutions on strategies of 
political contention. In addition, comparisons across three cases generate 
hypotheses that can be tested by further comparison against more general 
observations of other North Sumatra districts. 
                                                            
25 Barbara Geddes, “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias 
in Comparative Politics,” Political Analysis 2 (1990): 131-150. 
26 This kind of analysis is sometimes called process-tracing. See Erik Martinez Kuhonta, Dan 
Slater and Tuong Vu, “Introduction: The Contributions of Southeast Asian Political Studies,” 
in Southeast Asia in Political Science: Theory, Region and Qualitative Analysis, Erik 
Martinez Kuhonta, Dan Slater and Tuong Vu, eds. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2008): 1-29. 
27 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1997). 
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 The approach developed in the thesis will be useful elsewhere in 
Indonesia to the extent that similar sources of political power are available to 
aspiring elites. This is likely to be the case in districts that resemble the 
districts under study economically, socially and institutionally. The cases 
exhibit institutional constraints and socio-economic variation typical of 
Indonesia’s Outer Islands. Economically, two of the three districts depend on 
agricultural products and natural resources, while the third district has a 
diversified economy that nevertheless features agricultural products. Socially, 
the cases vary from rural, poor and remote in Tapanuli Selatan to an urban 
hinterland in Serdang Bedagai. Institutionally, district governments in North 
Sumatra are subject to the same fiscal, electoral and bureaucratic arrangements 
as the rest of Indonesia, albeit with important exceptions. Fiscally, they 
operate with much smaller budgets than the most densely populated districts 
on Java and districts that receive substantial revenue-sharing payments.28 Nor 
should they be compared to Indonesia’s special autonomous regions which are 
governed by special fiscal and electoral laws.29 
 The emphasis on coalitions draws the analysis into the study of 
collective action. Charles Tilly has described a model for collective action in 
which contending groups mobilize resources as they struggle for power.30 Dan 
Slater, drawing on Etzioni’s work, classifies those resources as coercive, 
remunerative and symbolic.31 Slater notes that different sets of elites have 
                                                            
28 These districts are in East Kalimantan, Riau, South Sulawesi and Papua, Direktoral Jenderal 
Perimbangan Keuangan, “Data APBD Tahun 2010,” Kementerian Keuangan Republik 
Indonesia, 20 July 2010; accessed at www.djpk.depkeu.go.id, 23 June 2011. 
29 Indonesia’s special autonomous regions are Aceh, DKI Jakarta, DIY Yogyakarta and Papua. 
30 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978). 
31 Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations: On Power, 
Involvement, and Their Correlates (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), cited in Dan 
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access to different resources in varying proportion. National state officials, for 
example, command coercive resources due to their authority over the military 
and police, while communal elites manipulate symbolic resources in their 
capacities as religious and customary leaders.32 The value of the resources at 
the disposal of a particular organization depends on its relationship to other 
contending groups. As Martin Shefter explains in the context of the American 
party system, when parties are strong and the bureaucracy is weak, parties may 
override the bureaucracy to extract resources from the state and use them to 
construct patronage machines. Conversely, when the bureaucracy is strong but 
parties are weak, an unresponsive bureaucratic state may develop.33 Under 
specific conditions, powerful individuals can capture such bureaucracies and 
direct them capriciously; a state of affairs Benedict Anderson called the “state-
qua-state.”34 Elites exercise power to the degree that their influence over 
institutions allows them to deliver resources, or in Tilly’s language, to the 
degree they command mobilized groups. 
 In North Sumatra, provincial and local bureaucracies, certain national 
parties, local and provincial legislatures, business contractors and popular 
organizations are powerful institutions that command remunerative, symbolic 
and, to a lesser extent, coercive resources. In the districts, the resources 
available to contending coalitions depend on what combination of these 
                                                                                                                                                           
Slater, Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010): 16. 
32 Slater, Ordering Power, 15-17. 
33 Martin Shefter, Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994): 61-63. 
34 He was referring specifically to New Order Indonesia. Benedict Anderson, “Old State, New 
Society: Indonesia’s New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective,” Journal of Asian 
Studies 42.3 (1983): 488. 
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institutions they control. The set of resources, in turn, constrains the types of 
political strategies they are able to utilize in pursuit of power. The next section 
outlines the pressures encouraging the formation of coalitions, while the 
following section describes the institutions associated with each type of 
coalition and the resources and strategies that flow from them. 
 
Coalitions, not Strongmen 
 There is a widespread misperception among political observers of 
Indonesia that decentralization has liberated district executives from the 
restraining influence of vertical oversight or horizontal accountability. In the 
expression of the Indonesian press, district executives adopt the style of “little 
kings.”35 The Economist has articulated the case for the caricature. 
“Prospective candidates rack up big debts to bribe voters and political parties. 
Then, they resort to embezzlement in office to pay the debts.” In this way, 
they circumvent electoral accountability. The Economist and others cite 
hundreds of ongoing corruption cases involving district executives as evidence 
of misgovernment, and blame local autonomy because “this is what happens 
when local politicians are given their head.”36 
 The Economist has accurately described the situation on the ground, 
but its conclusion that debt and corruption are symptoms of local autonomy is 
mistaken. On the contrary, when district executives take office with big debts 
and face prosecution for corruption, it is evidence of Indonesia’s local 
accountability mechanisms at work. Debts oblige executives to answer to 
                                                            
35See, for example, Nasrullah Nara, “Pilkada dan Raja-raja Kecil,” Kompas, 1 March 2008; 
Bersihar Lubis, “Tuan dan Pelayan,” Harian Medan Bisnis, 27 April 2011. 
36 “Power to the people! No, wait…” The Economist, 19 March 2011. 
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creditors and arise in part due to strong horizontal checks, formal and 
informal, that exist at the local level. The central government has the authority 
to exercise vertical oversight in a variety of ways, including prosecuting 
corruption, disbursing local revenues, auditing local expenditures and 
overturning local legislation. Although it is convenient to reduce local 
government to the actions of district executives, in fact their behavior is 
circumscribed by many constraints. 
Local elections are expensive. Candidates must sponsor rallies, pay for 
advertising and underwrite their campaign team.37 Opinion polling costs Rp 
300 million (US$33,000) in districts outside of Java.38 Add unreported 
expenses, to buy votes and bribe political parties, and costs reach into the 
millions of dollars. In 2005, Sukardi Rinakit estimated that district campaigns 
cost up to US$1.6 million.39 By contrast, district budgets are limited and 
district executives do not enjoy full discretionary authority over them. In the 
average 2010 budget, sixty-one percent of annual expenditures covered fixed 
administrative costs, leaving only Rp 260 billion (US$29 million) available for 
discretionary procurement and development spending.40 A district executive 
who depends on budget fraud to raise political funds will attempt to capture 
                                                            
37 Marcus Mietzner, “Political opinion polling in post-authoritarian Indonesia: Catalyst or 
obstacle to democratic consolidation?” Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 165.1 
(2009): 95-126. 
38 “Biaya Politik Makin Mahal,” Kompas, 14 June 2010. 
39 Sukardi Rinakit, “Indonesian regional elections in praxis,” IDSS Commentaries No. 65 
(Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 27 September 2005) cited in Hadiz, 
Localising Power, 121. Buehler more conservatively estimates US$500,000-700,000 in 
“resource-poor districts” in South Sulawesi, but expects higher costs in wealthier districts. 
Buehler, “Importance of Personal Networks,” 116, fn. 20. 
40 Calculated from Ditjen Perimbangan Keuangan, “Data APBD Tahun 2010.” 
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these funds by marking up the value of tendered projects and by demanding 
kickbacks from successful contractors.41 
To achieve this, a district executive needs the cooperation of local 
business contractors, high-level bureaucrats and district assembly members. 
Business contractors must agree to the terms and pay the kickbacks. The 
bureaucrats directing government agencies (dinas pemerintah), such as 
education, health and public works, must collaborate because they manage the 
projects. Finally, the assembly must acquiesce because it passes the annual 
budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanjaan Daerah, APBD) and budget 
report (Pertanggungjawaban Pelaksanaan APBD), and it debates the annual 
executive performance review (Laporan Keterangan Pertanggungjawaban 
Bupati, LKPj).42 By tempting executives to defraud the district budget, 
campaign debts thus encourage the formation of coalitions among the 
executive, assembly, bureaucracy and local business contractors.43 Not 
coincidentally, in many cases an executive’s creditors come from these same 
groups, further cementing the coalition.44 Although the mechanism is 
                                                            
41 “Satu Tersangka Setiap Pekan,” Kompas, 18 January 2011. Contrast the current spoils of 
elected office to the New Order, when salary lands were the prize of intensely fought village 
elections. See Douglas Kammen, “Pilkades: Democracy, Village Elections, and Protest in 
Indonesia,” in Southeast Asia Over Three Generations: Essays Presented to Benedict R. O’G. 
Anderson, ed. James Siegel and Audrey Kahin (Ithaca: Cornell SEAP, 2003): 303-330. 
42 Although Buehler notes that assemblies’ oversight powers have diminished with Law 
32/2004, they nevertheless use deliberations over budgets and performance reviews as a 
pretext to stonewall or criticize the executive, and to establish special investigatory 
committees (Pansus, Panitia Khusus). As a result, executives continue to “buy off 
parliamentarians” despite the new law. Buehler, “Decentralisation and Local Democracy,” 
277-280. 
43 Obviously, officials can choose not to cooperate, which they often do. Nevertheless, 
executives who fail to fashion a manageable coalition, such as the executive in Tapanuli 
Selatan during 2005-2010, usually get replaced by candidates who do. 
44 “Bisnis Berelasi dengan Politik,” Kompas, 30 March 2011. 
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informal, the high cost of campaigning ensures that many district executives 
remain horizontally accountable to their local political allies. 
The central government holds broad powers of vertical oversight. The 
independent central government auditing agency (Badan Pemeriksaan 
Keuangan, BPK) reviews district finances every year. The provincial attorney 
general and the central anti-corruption agency (Komisi Pemberantasan 
Korupsi, KPK) have the authority to pursue criminal investigations for 
corruption.45 That they do this often and successfully is evident from the huge 
number of cases. In early 2011, 155 corruption investigations of executives 
throughout Indonesia were ongoing or recently concluded.46 Furthermore, 
most districts depend on block grants (Dana Alokasi Umum) from the Ministry 
of Finance for annual revenues. In 2010, the average district received 54% of 
its annual revenue from these grants.47 Although the Ministry determines 
disbursement amounts according to a predetermined formula, district 
governments are nevertheless fiscally dependent on Jakarta. Finally, the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Home Affairs monitor local 
legislation and strike down local laws judged to contravene national ones. As 
of April 2010, for example, the Ministry of Finance had objected to 4,885 
local taxes (pajak daerah) and user fees (retribusi daerah), of which the 
Ministry of Home Affairs had overturned 1,843.48 
                                                            
45 On the uneven exercise of their authority, see Jamie Davidson, “Politics-as-usual on trial: 
Regional anti-corruption campaigns in Indonesia,” The Pacific Review 20.1 (March 2007): 75-
99. 
46 “Satu Tersangka Setiap Pekan,” Kompas, 18 January 2011. 
47 Calculated from Ditjen Perimbangan Keuangan, “Data APBD Tahun 2010.” 
48 Robert Endi Jaweng, “Otonomi dan Distrosi Perda Investasi,” Kompas, 20 July 2010. Taxes 
and user fees that ostensibly deter investment comprise the overwhelming majority of 
overturned legislation. By contrast, the central government has taken a cautious approach to 
religiously-based regulations. For example, the Supreme Court (MA, Mahkamah Agung) 
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In sum, accountability mechanisms pressure district executives to 
conspire with other elites. The most stable district governments obtain the 
cooperation of business contractors, high level bureaucrats and a majority of 
the district assembly. When elected officials are broke and in debt, they must 
fashion a ruling coalition that includes these groups if they hope to get elected, 
pay off their campaign debts and pursue reelection. It is not individual “little 
kings” who are corrupt, but collusion across the political class. 
 
Three Types of Coalitions 
At least three types of coalitions facilitate political collusion at the 
local level. The discussion that follows presents local mafias, party machines 
and mobilizing coalitions as ideal types, while in practice they change over 
time and exhibit features of multiple types.49 Nevertheless, conceptualizing 
ideal types is a useful tool for analyzing the resources and interests that 
animate real-world coalitions. Furthermore, the types are not meant to be 
exhaustive because in other locations different sources of power may 
predominate. They do, however, capture the range of variation present in the 
case studies described here. 
 Contrasting institutional composition distinguishes local political 
coalitions. Mafias integrate business contractors with the organs of local 
government only. Machines use party connections to involve provincial and 
                                                                                                                                                           
refused to review a controversial anti-prostitution law in Tangerang because its passage 
satisfied procedural requirements. See Robin Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations in 
Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?” in Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in 
Indonesia, Greg Fealy and Sally White, eds. (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008): 174-191. 
49 For ideal types, see Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans. Edward 
Shils and Henry Finch (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1949). 
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central bureaucracies, such as the judiciary, the Governor’s office, the anti-
corruption agency and the election commission, in local politics. Mobilizing 
coalitions, which may and often do utilize money and the use of violence, 
include at least one organization, such as an NGO, a youth group or a religious 
association, which mobilizes popular support among diffuse groups such as 
peasants, villagers, or ethnic communities. 
The set of institutions that each coalition controls shapes its resources, 
strategies and orientation. Local mafias often practice “money politics” among 
the political elite, party machines use organizational networks to bring central 
and provincial power – coercive, remunerative and symbolic – to bear on local 
politics, and mobilizing coalitions seek strength in numbers by incorporating 
previously excluded groups. 
 
Local Mafias 
 Mafias can only exist when they control local state institutions. 
Coalition members—business contractors, assembly members, high-level 
bureaucrats and the executive—cooperate to extract financial resources from 
the local bureaucracy and the annual budget. In districts where forestry and 
plantation agriculture is lucrative, they also manipulate land concessions. 
Members divide the spoils among themselves to maintain the coalition and use 
the remainder to contest elections. The coalition is oriented horizontally 
because it is limited to members of the local elite. Local mafias resemble 
Sidel’s “shadowy…cliques of businessman, politicians, and officials,” and 
their prevalence explains the observation of Mietzner and Hadiz that most 
local politicians come from these groups. Youth group thugs, the other group 
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in Hadiz’ political sociology of elites, participate as business contractors and 
assembly members.50 
 Mafias extract patronage from the district budget in a variety of ways, 
the most important being the project tender process as detailed above.51 In 
addition, executives embezzle from the district budget directly. The budget 
line for social aid expenses (Belanjaan Bantuan Sosial) is particularly 
vulnerable to embezzlement because charitable projects are not audited except 
to confirm disbursement. Many executives abuse their discretion and social 
aid expenses tend to rise dramatically in years immediately preceding 
elections.52 A third method of fraud involves skimming the interest from funds 
deposited in provincial banks. Many districts run sizeable annual budget 
surpluses which they deposit in provincial state-owned banks or convert to 
Bank Indonesia certificates (Sertifikat Bank Indonesia).53 In North Sumatra, 
the provincial state-owned bank is called Bank Sumut (Bank Sumatera Utara, 
North Sumatra Bank); other provinces have their own bank. Many districts as 
well as the provincial government own shares in the bank. According to one 
source, provincial banks secretly reinvest district funds at an interest rate 
                                                            
50 For more on youth groups, see Loren Ryter, “Their Moment in the Sun: The New 
Indonesian Parliamentarians from the Old OKP,” in State of Authority, van Klinken and 
Barker, eds.: 181-218; Ian Wilson, “The Rise and Fall of Political Gangsters in Indonesian 
Democracy,” in Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia, Aspinall and Mietzner, eds.: 199-
218. 
51 For examples, see “Bisnis Berelasi dengan Politik,” Kompas, 30 March 2011. 
52 “Anggaran Daerah Masih Dibajak Elite Lokal: Modus Terbesar dengan Topeng Bantuan 
Sosial,” Jawa Pos, 20 December 2010. 
53 “Rp 43 Triliun Anggaran Daerah Disimpan di SBI,” Suara Pembaruan, 28 June 2006; 
“Wapres: BPD Jangan Timbun Uang di SBI,” Jawa Pos, 22 December 2010. 
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greater than the bank rate. The difference in interest remains unreported, and 
the profits are divided between district and bank officials.54 
 The district executive’s control over bureaucratic appointments 
presents opportunities to extract money by selling positions. This occurs at all 
levels of the local bureaucracy, but the price of the bribe rises with the pay 
scale. Entry level jobs reportedly cost Rp 20 million (just under US$2,000) in 
Central Sulawesi in 2003,55 while a source in Tapanuli Selatan claimed that 
agency directors (kepala dinas) paid Rp 500 million (US$55,000) for their 
positions during the 2005-2010 executive term.56 Selling positions of this 
caliber, however, undermines the mafia coalition, because agency directors 
who have purchased their positions will be less inclined to cooperate with the 
executive than those who were appointed for their loyalty. 
 Patronage extracted from the district budget and bureaucracy circulates 
as follows. Executives and agency directors exercise their official authority 
over the budget and bureaucratic appointments to embezzle state funds, skim 
interest and collect bribes. Furthermore, they strike deals with business 
contractors to award project tenders or land concessions in return for 
kickbacks. Finally, the executive obtains the acquiescence of the district 
assembly by bribing members. Often, single individuals play multiple roles. 
For example, assembly members may also own a contracting business. This is 
often the case when youth group members sit in the district assembly. 
Although the coalition requires the cooperation of each group, the lynchpin is 
                                                            
54 Personal interview, Medan, 26 August 2010; “BI Paling Bertanggung Jawab dalam Praktik 
Pemberian Komisi,” Kompas, 5 January 2010. 
55 Lorraine Aragon, “Elite competition in Central Sulawesi,” in Renegotiating Boundaries, 
Schulte Nordholt and van Klinken, eds.: 40-41. 
56 Personal interview, Padang Sidimpuan, 22 October 2010. 
Tans 18 
 
the district executive. Because the coalition’s financial resources originate in 
local state institutions, control over them is crucial to the success of the 
coalition. 
 By circulating state patronage among a narrow faction of local elites, 
mafias achieve a stable equilibrium between the value of available patronage 
and the cost of maintaining the coalition, except in election years. Popular 
elections strain the coalition in two ways. First, national election law requires 
that all candidates obtain nomination from a party or coalition of parties 
representing 15% of the electorate in a given district.57 Second, candidates 
must muster a plurality of voters to win the election. Both requirements 
introduce huge costs. It has been widely reported that Indonesian political 
parties auction candidate nominations to the highest bidder.58 The larger the 
party’s share of district assembly seats, the more expensive the nomination 
fee. For the largest parties, bribes range from hundreds of millions to billions 
of rupiah (tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of US dollars).59 Once 
they procure a nomination, mafia candidates must raise popular support. 
Because mafias do not extend patronage beyond their core members, except to 
the extent that construction contracts provide employment to laborers, their 
candidates resort to vote-buying as the fastest means of attracting voters 
during in election years. At campaign events, candidates hand out rice, 
                                                            
57 Although candidates may run independently, very high costs ensure that few attempt it and 
fewer succeed. See Buehler, “Decentralisation and Local Democracy,” 273-274. 
58 See, for example, Michael Buehler and Paige Tan, “Party Candidate Relationships in 
Indonesian Local Politics: A Case Study of the 2005 Regional Elections in Gowa, South 
Sulawesi Province,” Indonesia 84 (October 2007): 67. 
59 Nankyung Choi, “Local Elections and Democracy in Indonesia: The Riau Archipelago,” 




clothing and other household necessities. They “reimburse” event participants 
for transport costs. As the election approaches, and especially on the eve of the 
election, they hand out cash in key communities. 
Although corrupt campaign practices are alarming, they have not 
enabled mafias to circumvent the democratic process.60 On the contrary, 
mafias resort to vote-buying and bribing parties out of weakness. In 2010 in 
North Sumatra, many mafias lost elections despite efficient and widespread 
use of these methods, not least the incumbent mafia in Labuhan Batu. In some 
places where the tactics succeeded, they provoked violent reactions from the 
opposition, ranging from angry demonstrations to riots.61 
Three weaknesses make mafias unstable. First, their candidates must 
expend campaign funds for both nominations and votes, while machine 
candidates spend less on nominations and mobilization candidates spend less 
to buy votes. Second, mafias do not inspire popular loyalty and challengers 
have an advantage when voters are dissatisfied with the performance of an 
incumbent mafia. Finally, mafias rely too heavily on control over the office of 
the district executive. If they lose executive patronage, they have little hope of 
preserving the coalition. This weakness is particularly debilitating when party 
machines use provincial or central influence to remove district executives by 





60 Hadiz, by contrast, argues that they have. Hadiz, Localising Power, 119-123. 




In contrast to mafias, party machines draw strength from Indonesia’s 
highly centralized parties, which enjoy influence over and access to provincial 
and central state institutions. Machines will be most influential in provinces 
where one party dominates the provincial government. By combining party 
organizational resources, the legislative functions of local and provincial 
assemblies and the coercive power of bureaucratic institutions like the attorney 
general’s office, machines can attack the vulnerabilities of a mafia even 
without significant local support. In most districts, however, machines also 
benefit from the support of party allies in the local bureaucracy and assembly. 
Machines are oriented vertically upward, because they link local officials with 
party power at higher levels of the Indonesian state. 
After decades of nearly uninterrupted control over the Governor’s 
office in North Sumatra, Golkar is the party with the most influence in the 
provincial bureaucracy.62 In local power contests, Golkar deploys 
gubernatorial power for partisan purposes. Two appointments in particular 
have far reaching consequences. The provincial attorney general (Jaksa 
Agung) coordinates criminal and corruption investigations and decides 
whether to drop, prosecute or hand cases over to the anti-corruption 
commission. The task is easily politicized when the attorney general’s party 
allies wish to challenge local mafias, especially those involved in corruption, 
illegal logging or gambling. Whenever district executives do not finish a term, 
or when new districts are formed, the Governor appoints acting executives 
                                                            
62 Since the consolidation of the New Order, the one exception was during 2005-2008, when 
Rudolf Pardede of PDI-P succeeded Rizal Nurdin after the latter died in office. 
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(Penjabat Bupati) endowed with the same powers as elected ones. They hold 
discretionary authority over local patronage because they too oversee project 
tenders and appoint bureaucratic officials. In newly formed districts, the role 
has additional importance because of the responsibility to form the local 
election commission.63 An acting executive in a new district can divert 
patronage away from aspiring mafias and ensure that sympathetic 
commissioners coordinate the inaugural election. 
Golkar’s legislative power in North Sumatra, though not absolute, still 
reinforces the party’s bureaucratic power. During the legislative term 2004 – 
2009, Golkar held 19 out of 85 seats in a provincial assembly that included 14 
parties. The second-largest party, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, 
(Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan, PDI-P), had 13 seats.64 Golkar 
tumbled in the 2009 general elections and won only 13 seats, well behind 
Democrat’s (Partai Demokrat) 27, but still ahead of the other 13 parties 
represented in the expanded 100 seat legislature.65 The party’s provincial 
electoral performance is indicative of its dependable voting base across North 
Sumatra, which has elected similar legislative contingents at the local level. 
In the fragmented provincial assembly, the size of the Golkar faction 
gives it negotiating leverage over legislation, while its influence within the 
executive branch makes it a necessary parliamentary coalition member. When 
parties in the provincial assembly collude to share patronage, Golkar 
                                                            
63 Although the district executive does not directly appoint the five commissioners, he or she 
appoints a representative to the selection board and can thereby veto appointments by proxy. 
64 Komisi Pemilihan Umum Sumatera Utara, “Daftar Nama-Nama Anggota DPRD Provinsi 
Sumatera Utara Hasil Pemilihan Umum 2004,” no date; accessed at www.kpusumut.org, 13 
April 2010. 
65 Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Provinsi Sumatera Utara, “Fraksi-Fraksi,” no date; 
accessed at www.dprd-sumutprov.go.id, 27 June 2011. 
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benefits.66 The assembly allocates projects which Golkar-influenced provincial 
agencies can direct to favored districts. The agencies have more leeway to 
distribute jobs, projects and favors to party allies when Golkar loyalists and 
friendly parties sit on assembly oversight committees. 
Legislative power confers another advantage to Golkar with respect to 
the creation of new districts. Proposals to create new districts by subdividing 
existing districts must gain legislative approval at all levels of government: 
district, provincial and central. This allows the major parties, which influence 
legislation at each level, to draw new districts which benefit them and 
handicap local rivals. If they subdivide districts in such a way that it splits the 
voting base of local mafias, party machines have an opportunity to counter-
mobilize a reconstituted voting base.67 
 In addition to its bureaucratic and legislative powers, Golkar’s 
organizational resources advantage machine-backed district executives. Party 
discipline reduces the costs of obtaining legislative cooperation, because 
sanctions replace bribery as the mechanism of influence. Sanctions are 
compelling because parties, not assembly members, control seats. When 
parties revoke the party membership of assembly members, the assembly 
member loses his or her seat and the party chooses a replacement.68 During 
elections, a machine candidate has a financial advantage over candidates who 
                                                            
66 Slater has argued convincingly that parties in the national assembly collude to share 
patronage. See Dan Slater, “Indonesia’s Accountability Trap: Party Cartels and Presidential 
Power after Democratic Transition,” Indonesia 78 (October 2004): 61-92. 
67 Kimura, “Proliferating provinces,” 423-425. 
68 The parties’ right of recall (PAW, pergantian antarwaktu) was established in Law No. 
22/2003 and upheld by the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi) in decision No 
008/PUU-IV/2006. See M. Hadi Shubhan, “’Recall’: Antara Hak Partai Politik dan Hak 
Berpolitik Anggota Parpol,” Jurnal Konstitusi 3.4 (December 2006): 30-57. 
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have to expend campaign funds to chase nominations. Machine candidates are 
more likely to enjoy the active support of local party members compared to 
unaffiliated candidates who pay a bribe in exchange for nominal support.69 
Parties also contribute costly technical assistance in the form of political 
consultants and polling services.70 
 Party discipline, however, does not always extend to leadership. Parties 
can act capriciously as a result of internal power struggles, undermining the 
strength of the machine. At times, factional competition paralyzes machines, 
as it did in 2005 in Tapanuli Selatan when opposing Golkar factions fought 
bitterly over the candidate nomination. Leadership transitions lead to 
backtracking and uncoordinated strategy. In Binjai city, where Golkar’s 
former provincial chair was outgoing mayor in 2010, the party opposed the 
mayor’s brother-in-law in municipal elections and both candidates lost. 
Organizational incoherence is the Achilles heel of party machines. 
Although Indonesian parties interpenetrate the bureaucracy and 
comprise the legislatures, it is important to note that parties, governors and 
provincial assemblies do not possess formal authority over the Indonesian 
state’s centralized instruments of coercion: the police and armed forces. Not 
even Golkar can presume the political support of the police or armed forces.71 
 Party machines have a formal advantage over local mafias because 
they face lower costs and enjoy greater resources. They save money on party 
nominations and cooperation between the district assembly and executive. 
                                                            
69 Mietzner, “Political opinion polling,” 111-112. 
70 “Biaya Politik Makin Mahal,” Kompas, 14 June 2010. 
71 On civil-military relations, see Jun Honna, “From dwifungsi to NKRI: Regime change and 
political activism of the Indonesian military,” in Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia, 
Bunte and Ufen, eds.: 226-247. 
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They attack opponents with criminal investigations and bureaucratic 
reassignments, and they have access to a much larger pool of patronage 
because provincial allies earmark projects for their districts. When machines 
face electoral challenges, provincial patronage helps them to develop a broad 
coalition, further reducing costs by decreasing their dependence on vote-
buying to mobilize popular support. 
 
Mobilizing Coalitions 
 Any elite coalition can involve social mobilization, provided that it 
derives a significant measure of political power from organized social groups 
that support it collectively. Even in districts where popular organizations are 
numerous and well-developed, they rarely possess formal access to the state. 
But when local mafias or party machines face the prospect of losing power, 
they sometimes reach out to existing social organizations or catalyze new 
mobilizations. In this sense, mobilizing coalitions are oriented vertically 
downward because they connect political elites with larger and more diffuse 
social groups. 
 Mobilized social groups are neither ardent opponents of the elite nor 
complacent puppets of their regimes. While Sidel’s observation that 
Indonesians vigorously participate in collective and contentious politics leads 
him to believe that popular mobilization is the most likely impediment to 
predatory local rule, the allegiance of local society should not be so quickly 
presumed.72 The strongest mobilizing coalitions emerge in districts where 
competing elite coalitions are evenly matched and dense social networks and 
                                                            
72 Sidel, “Bossism and Democracy,” 73-74. 
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well-developed organizations already exist. Close electoral competition may 
prompt one or both coalitions to seek popular support in order to gain an 
advantage. The pressure to mobilize applies whether the types of contending 
coalitions are similar or different. However, when a machine challenges a 
mafia its formal advantages give it little incentive to mobilize unless the mafia 
does so first. If mobilized social groups are routinized into durable 
organizations, they join the existing coalition and pressure it to respond to 
their needs and expectations. The implication is paradoxical: the more fully 
integrated a mobilized social group is within an elite coalition, the more it 
constrains those elites. 
 Because expanding the coalition entails new constraints and 
obligations, local politicians countenance it only as a last resort.73 Whenever 
possible, elites choose strategies such as vote-buying or fear mongering that 
mobilize voters without organizing them.74 These strategies, however, are 
unreliable because they are based on single transactions or fleeting fears. 
Voters who accept payments, for example, might accept larger bribes from 
other candidates or fail to vote for any candidate. Organizing, by contrast, 
generates loyalty by institutionalizing relationships between social groups and 
the coalition. Vote-buying may bring enough people to the polls to win in a 
secure bailiwick, but in competitive districts coalitions integrate social 
organizations or face defeat. 
                                                            
73 Martin Shefter, Political Parties and the State, 6-7. 
74 The 2010 Medan mayoral election was exemplary in this regard. See Edward Aspinall, 
Sebastian Dettman and Eve Warburton, “When religion trumps ethnicity: A regional election 
case study from Indonesia,” South East Asia Research 19.1 (March 2011): 27-58. 
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Mobilization typically occurs via the mediation of well-developed 
organizations because they already command a following, understand how to 
organize collective action and possess the capacity to distribute patronage. In 
North Sumatra, NGOs and youth groups most often play the role, but religious 
and cultural associations are also prominent mobilizers.75 Organized labor 
rarely, if ever, does so.76 Different organizations reach different 
constituencies. NGOs serve poor occupational groups like farmers, fisherfolk 
and workers and employ middle-class professionals. Youth groups integrate 
business contractors, criminal networks and laboring urban males. Religious 
and cultural associations appeal to religious fealty and ethnic solidarity, 
respectively. 
In North Sumatra in general, politicians offer a combination of three 
basic incentives to attract social groups to the coalition. First, politicians 
frequently appeal to national, ethnic, religious or community identities to 
convince groups that they will advance their collectively perceived interests. 
Identity appeals often stoke fear and prejudice, but they also promise 
preferential benefits for the group. In North Sumatra’s Tapanuli Selatan 
district, for example, Golkar’s candidate won the support of an entire 
community in 2010 by promising to move the district capital to Sipirok town. 
Second, incumbent politicians distribute patronage in the form of special 
community development projects, perquisites for village leaders and projects 
tendered to NGOs or other organizations. Distributing patronage to social 
                                                            
75 For example, candidates in the 2010 Medan mayoral election courted ethnic associations 
with limited success and Muslim religious leaders with more. NGOs and youth groups were 
also active campaigners. Aspinall, et al. “When religion trumps ethnicity.” 
76 Hadiz, Localising Power, 145-160. 
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groups badly strains mafias, because their resources are limited to what they 
can generate locally, but not machines, which draw resources from multiple 
sources. Finally, opposition coalitions without access to state patronage may 
promise populist policy changes. In North Sumatra in 2010, common promises 
were free identity card processing, free education and district-sponsored life 
insurance. Mobilizing coalitions experience intense pressure to deliver on their 
promises once in office. 
 The ability of a coalition to retain the support of organized social 
groups depends on its ability to continue to meet their expectations while in 
office.77 Machines can please a wide range of social groups because they 
control a deep pool of patronage and exercise influence over provincial and 
national policy. In cases where mafias mobilize significant social support, by 
contrast, they face serious obstacles to following through on their promises 
because of the numerous constraints limiting the power of the district 
executive. The executive must satisfy the core members of the coalition, a 
difficult task of itself, while ensuring that there is patronage left over for 
societal partners. 
 
Organization of the Thesis 
 The thesis considers each case study in turn, highlighting the contests 
between elite coalitions in each district and demonstrating the sources of each 
coalition’s power. It begins with Labuhan Batu, where an opposition mafia 
                                                            
77 For an argument that incumbent machines in American cities carefully managed supply and 
demand for patronage resources, see Steven Erie, Rainbow’s End: Irish-Americans and the 




used a strategy of social mobilization to defeat an incumbent mafia. Tapanuli 
Selatan follows, where the Golkar machine displaced a timber mafia by 
subdividing the district into three new districts. It presents Serdang Bedagai 
third because all three types of coalitions have contended for power in that 
district. In 2005, a local mafia gave way to the Golkar machine after the 
election resulted in a virtual tie. Once in office, Golkar pursued a strategy of 
social mobilization and constructed a broad and reliable social coalition. 
 The case studies are based on 78 field interviews conducted in North 
Sumatra during several trips to the province during 2010. The interview 
sources include journalists, politicians, civil servants, election commissioners, 
businessmen and NGO activists. Their names are withheld for confidentiality. 
Archival newspaper research corroborates and augments the interviews. In 
most cases, newspaper sources were consulted for the years 2005-2010 in 
order to cover one complete election cycle.78 Press statements released by 
North Sumatra’s NGO community are a valuable source of data, as are 
government publications, especially the Central Statistics Bureau’s Statistical 
Yearbooks and election tabulation data published by North Sumatra’s various 
election commissions. 
 Finally, the conclusion situates the study within North Sumatra more 
generally and discusses the implications for decentralization and democracy. 
In 2010, mafias fared poorly at the polls and were replaced in many places by 
Golkar candidates. If they did not open the coalition to new members, either 
popular groups or the machine itself, mafias could not resist machine 
challenges that deployed the combined resources of central parties, provincial 
                                                            
78 For online media sources, the URL is given in the List of Press Sources. 
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bureaucracies and legislative influence. The results reflect ongoing political 
recentralization that mirrors administrative counter-reform pursued by both the 
Megawati and Yudhoyono governments. Paradoxically, counter-reform made 
politics more inclusive because close competition between mafias and 
machines drew previously excluded social groups into local politics. Whether 
this indicated democratic growth or was merely a temporary phenomenon 





Labuhan Batu: Mafias and Mobilization 
 
 Political contention in Labuhan Batu district exemplifies the pressures 
that make local mafias unstable, even when they do not contend against party 
machines. The Golkar machine never challenged it, but the district’s 
incumbent mafia collapsed anyway in 2008, midway through its second term 
in office. The two resulting factions adopted starkly contrasting approaches to 
the 2010 district elections, but neither was able to reconstitute a durable 
coalition. The limited pool of state patronage and the challenges of direct 
elections strained each version of the mafia and made politics unpredictable as 
successive coalitions failed. 
Although no mafia fully succeeded, the outcome of the 2010 election 
illustrates that a campaign strategy of mobilization is superior to the 
techniques referred to as “money politics.” When the incumbent mafia 
splintered, the resulting factions neatly divided local institutions. The 
executive, Haji Tengku Milwan, maintained his grip on the bureaucracy, while 
his opponents were a clique of businessmen and allied district assembly 
members. Their contrasting positions shaped their respective campaign 
strategies. Milwan leaned on the civil service to support his wife, Adlina, as a 
proxy candidate and spent an enormous amount of money to secure party 
nominations and buy votes. The opposition defeated Adlina decisively by 
mobilizing an extensive campaign network with the help of local youth groups 
and NGOs. The logic of money politics ultimately created damaging 
contradictions that undid incumbent Milwan and his wife. 
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Located at the southern end of the plantation belt that parallels 
Sumatra’s east coast, Labuhan Batu and its derivative districts, Labuhan Batu 
Utara and Labuhan Batu Selatan, produce by far the most palm oil and rubber 
in North Sumatra.1 Steadily rising global palm oil prices have made these 
districts some of the province’s wealthiest as measured by gross regional 
product and gross product per capita.2 To be sure, the estates industry is 
dominated by large private and state-owned firms, but about one-quarter of the 
land devoted to palm oil and three-quarters of the land devoted to rubber are 
smallholdings, suggesting that small farmers also benefit from the current 
boom.3 
For a district with such vast plantations, Labuhan Batu is surprisingly 
urban. Accordingly, civil society organizations thrive. Its overall population 
density ranks in the top half of the province and residents are further 
concentrated in the district capital Rantauprapat, where over one-third of 
registered voters live.4 Several youth groups have active chapters and 
politically influential leaders. Ethnic associations, particularly Javanese and 
Chinese, command wide followings within their communities. And various 
NGOs serve farmers, plantation laborers and children, among others. 
                                                            
1 Dinas Perkebunan Propinsi Sumatera Utara, “Rekapitulasi Luas Areal dan Produksi 
Komoditi Kelapa Sawit Propinsi Sumatera Utara,” and “Rekapitulasi Luas Areal dan Produksi 
Komoditi Karet per Kabupaten di Propinsi Sumatera Utara,” 2004; accessed at 
www.deptan.go.id/daerah_new/sumut/disbun_sumut/index, 15 April 2010. 
2 Badan Pusat Statistik Sumatera Utara, “Sumatera Utara in Figures 2009,” Tables 11.3.1 and 
11.3.3, 2009. 
3 Disbun Sumut, “Rekap Luas Areal dan Produksi Kelapa Sawit,” and “Rekap Luas Areal dan 
Produksi Karet.” 
4 Badan Pusat Statistik, “Population Census 2010: Province Sumatera Utara,” 2010; accessed 
at www.bps.go.id, 6 July 2011; BPS Sumut, “Sumatera Utara in Figures 2009,” Table 1.1.3; 
Komisi Pemilihan Umum Labuhanbatu, “Rekapitulasi Jumlah Pemilih, TPS dan Surat Suara 
Pemilihan Umum Kepala Daerah dan Wakil Kepala Daerah di Tingkat Kabupaten,” 
Rantauprapat, 18 June 2010. 
Tans 33 
 
Historical legacies have disarticulated labor and the traditional 
nobility, however. The Malay aristocracy, whose sultans had collaborated with 
the Dutch during colonial days, was overthrown during the Indonesia 
Revolution in a string of bloody coups along Sumatra’s east coast. Some of the 
worst violence occurred in Labuhan Batu, where five ruling houses were 
attacked and dozens of family members killed in March 1946.5 For plantation 
labor, the Revolution initiated a brief period of organized action that lasted 
until 1957 when the nationalization and militarization of Dutch estates 
heightened repression. In 1965-66, labor was completely silenced by the 
destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, 
PKI) and its affiliated labor union, SARBUPRI (Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan 
Republik Indonesia, Union of Indonesian Plantation Workers).6 Evidence once 
again suggests that violence was at its worst in Labuhan Batu, where killing 
squads in Rantauprapat filled nightly quotas.7 
 
Milwan’s Mafia 
For the first ten years of the post-reform era, a former army colonel 
named Haji Tengku Milwan towered over Labuhan Batu’s local politics. He 
became district executive when the assembly selected him in the 2000 indirect 
elections and he governed the district during two five-year terms. His 
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distinguished military career, his success as an administrator and Labuhan 
Batu’s booming economy gave him sufficient stature that the local press 
fancied him a “national player”.8 He had ambitions to match and in 2007 made 
an abbreviated gubernatorial bid.9 He successfully entered provincial politics 
in 2010 when he was elected chair of the North Sumatra board of the 
Democrat Party.10 
The army assisted Milwan in the transition from uniformed to civilian 
office by posting him to Medan in 1998.11 The final posting, as deputy 
assistant for personnel in the regional military command, carried a promotion 
to colonel and returned him to his home province just before the first district 
elections of the post-reform era. He resigned from the post in 2000 to take up 
the executive office in Labuhan Batu.12 
Milwan’s use of the titles, “Haji” and “Tengku” denote religious and 
ethnic claims, respectively. The title Haji attests that Milwan has completed 
the pilgrimage to Mecca, while “Tengku” asserts a claim to aristocratic Malay 
heritage. Although Milwan was born in Medan, local tradition has it that 
Milwan’s family is from Labuhan Bilik, where a Malay statelet existed before 
the 1946 revolution.13 
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Milwan’s political power, however, was based not on noble birth but 
on control of the district budget, power over the local bureaucracy and 
collusive relationships with business contractors and assembly members. In 
other words, Milwan led a local mafia that grew rich by accepting kickbacks, 
selling positions and embezzling money. According to one report, project 
commissions during Milwan’s administration exceeded ten percent.14 To pay 
the fee, contractors inflated procurement costs by as much as 50%.15 
Executive Milwan preferred large, extravagant projects, and the costs to the 
state multiplied. For example, a sports complex in Rantauprapat took 13 years 
to build and cost nearly Rp 15 billion (US$1.6 million).16 A recent 
investigation has implicated Adlina, Milwan’s wife, in an organized syndicate 
that was accepting payments for bureaucratic appointments.17 Finally, the 
administration embezzled money directly from the district budget. The central 
audit board noted irregularities in district financial reporting during fiscal 
years 2004, 2005 and 2006, prompting one local newspaper to proclaim, 
“Audit findings: Millions of rupiah of Labuhan Batu district funds 
evaporate.”18 
The mafia included associates in many local institutions, particularly 
construction contractors, youth group leaders, assembly members, bureaucrats 
and Golkar. Fredy Simangunsong, a business contractor and leader of the local 
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chapter of the youth group named Working Youth Society (Ikatan Pemuda 
Karya, IPK), was Milwan’s most prominent ally. Fredy claims to have 
received contracts worth Rp 11 billion (US$1.2 million) in 2006 and Rp 24 
billion (US$2.6 million) in 2007, while paying kickbacks totaling Rp 1.6 
billion (US$175,000).19 Youth groups in North Sumatra commonly act as 
government contractors, and it is likely that Fredy’s counterparts from other 
youth groups used the same business model. Fredy’s wife, Elya Rosa Siregar, 
sat in the district assembly as a member of the Golkar delegation. She and her 
assembly colleagues cooperated with Milwan to the extent that they approved 
each budget and financial report. A member of the 1999-2004 assembly, 
Daslan Simandjuntak, recently testified before the central anti-corruption 
agency that he accepted bribes of Rp 30 million (US$3,000) to pass those 
bills.20 Three bureaucratic agencies were singled out in the central audit 
board’s reports of financial irregularities: health (Dinas Kesehatan), education 
(Dinas Pendidikan) and settlement and infrastructure (Dinas Kimprasda, 
Permukiman dan Prasarana Daerah). It is likely that the directors of these 
agencies were close allies of the mafia.21 
Golkar’s role in the mafia deserves special mention to demonstrate that 
Milwan’s coalition was not a party machine. Since retiring from his military 
career in 2000, Milwan has been opportunistic in his dealings with parties.22 In 
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2005, he was elected to lead the local chapter of Golkar at a time when its 11 
assembly seats were more than any other party. PDI-P, its nearest competitor, 
held 8 seats and 10 other parties shared the remaining 26 seats.23 During the 
peak of the mafia’s power, the chairmanship helped Milwan negotiate with the 
district assembly and offered a tantalizing chance at the gubernatorial 
nomination. Milwan did not, however, win Golkar’s endorsement for governor 
for the 2008 election, and he consequently looked elsewhere for a nomination. 
He was connected to both Demokrat and Development United Party (Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), much to the annoyance of Golkar’s provincial 
leaders, who sacked him in November 2007.24 Though Golkar still nominated 
Adlina during the 2010 district election, it was but 1 of 28 parties to do so and 
many local members resented the decision. Only five months after Adlina lost, 
Milwan became the chair of Demokrat’s provincial board. He exemplifies the 
independent politician who purchases nominations and frequently changes 
party colors.25 
 
The Mafia Collapses 
In 2008, Milwan lost control of the mafia and it collapsed into two 
competing factions. Milwan’s faction retained control over the local 
bureaucracy by virtue of his continuing term in executive office. This faction 
                                                            
23 Yos Batubara, “Evaluasi Hasi Penyelenggaraan Pemilu 2009: Dari Babak Baru Pemilihan 
Secara Langsung Tahun 2004 Ke Babak Pemilihan Secara Langsung Dengan Suara 
Terbanyak Tahun 2009 Kabupaten Labuhanbatu – Sumatera Utara,” TePI Indonesia, no date: 
12. 
24 “Heboh Isu Pemecatan HT Milwan, Dari Ketua Partai Golkar L. Batu,” Waspada Online, 31 
October 2007; accessed 6 February 2011; “HT Milwan Siap Dipecat Partai Golkar,” Antara 
News, unknown date; “HT Milwan Dicopot Sebagai Ketua Golkar Labuhan Batu,” Waspada 
Online, 22 November 2007; accessed 28 July 2011. 
25 Marcus Mietzner, “Political opinion polling,” 111-116. 
Tans 38 
 
also maintained relationships with various ethnic associations, particularly the 
Javanese migrant organization Pujakesuma (Putra Jawa Kelahiran Sumatera, 
Sons of Java Born in Sumatra). Pujakesuma’s local chairperson, Sudarwanto, 
served as deputy executive in Milwan’s administration. 
The opposing faction, on the other hand, was directed by a clique of 
powerful business contractors known locally simply as “the mafia”. Fredy 
Simangunsong was the most outspoken of the clique, but Ramli Siahaan, 
Tutur Parapat and Sujian, also known as Acan, were equal partners in the 
opposition. Each of these men, except Acan, combined business contracting 
and plantation ownership with leadership of a youth group. Acan was not 
affiliated with a youth group but was a prominent leader in Rantauprapat’s 
Chinese community. His business interests, however, were similar to the 
others, except that he also owned a shipbreaking yard that disassembled old 
ships and recycled the material.26 Although D.L. Sitorus was not as personally 
involved in local politics, the plantation tycoon supported this group as well. 
His party, the National People’s Concern Party (Partai Peduli Rakyat 
Nasional) endorsed the opposition candidate, Tigor Siregar, during the 2010 
election, contributing two vital seats toward the 15% nomination threshold.27 
To the alliance of business contractors and youth groups, the 
opposition faction added an assertive presence in the district assembly and 
support from some NGOs. Fredy’s wife, Elya Rosa Siregar, led an assembly 
contingent that claimed the sympathies of members from both of the two 
largest factions, Golkar and PDI-P, as well as from a number of smaller 
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parties.28 Their influence turned the legislature against Milwan. After the 2009 
general elections Elya Rosa became chair of the assembly (Ketua DPRD) and 
its hostility toward the executive intensified further. Finally, the opposition 
selected Suhari Pane, former chair of the election commission and longtime 
NGO activist, as its candidate for deputy executive in 2010. Suhari’s network 
among activists extended from farmers’ to women’s organizations and lent 
credibility to the ticket’s populist claims.29 
While the immediate reasons for the mafia’s collapse are vague, the 
underlying pressures that weakened the mafia are clear enough. Milwan and 
Fredy were bickering about money because both wished to use the coalition to 
advance their own ambitions. Fredy owed Milwan approximately Rp 1 billion 
in kickbacks (US$105,000) and complained that the graft was becoming 
exorbitant.30 After all, Milwan needed money if he was to realize his dream to 
become Governor. Meanwhile, it was rumored that Elya Rosa was at the time 
considering a bid for district executive, and Milwan likely felt Fredy was 
becoming too powerful a rival.31 Regardless of the particulars of the 
disagreement, Milwan’s mafia succumbed to a political dilemma. Two of its 
most important fundraising techniques, collecting project kickbacks and 
selling bureaucratic positions, alienated the contractors and bureaucrats whose 
cooperation it required to perform fraud. Just as Milwan embittered the 
business community, his heavy-handed management of the bureaucracy 
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provoked resentment among civil servants, many of whom did not support 
Adlina’s candidacy as whole-heartedly as they were instructed to do.32 
 In October 2008, the rift became public when the animosity between 
Milwan and Fredy boiled over. On 16 October, Fredy took the details of his 
business dealings with Milwan public in a press conference. He announced 
that he intended to press charges and promised that he and his friends would 
join the opposition. He also revealed that he had previously visited the 
district’s government agencies one by one to demand that they award 
government contracts according to proper legal procedure. The press 
conference touched off a series of public battles that culminated in Adlina’s 
defeat in the 2010 district election.33 
The press conference was Fredy’s retaliation after he had been 
dismissed from the district chairmanship of the youth organization IPK. He 
accused Milwan of interfering with the provincial leadership to have him 
sacked. Milwan accurately valued the importance of the position because 
IPK’s young, underemployed membership represented a pool of cheap labor, a 
muscular force for street politics and a vehicle for political organizing. 
Although Fredy never recovered the chairmanship, his associate Ramli 
incorporated a local chapter of a new youth group, MPI (Masyarakat 
Pancasila Indonesia), on 4 April 2009. Fredy and Tutur Parapat attended the 
opening ceremony, and the new organization would become a key part of the 
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opposition faction’s electoral campaign against Adlina.34 Fighting corruption 
was the theme of the night, and Ramli wasted no time taking the fight to 
Milwan. For example, on 16 April Ramli requested through the press that the 
central anti-corruption agency or the provincial attorney general’s office 
investigate the executive office for failing to re-tender projects that rolled over 
from one fiscal year to the next.35 
The controversy protesting the reassignment of over one hundred 
school headmasters provided the opposition faction its best opportunity to 
attack Milwan. In 2008, shortly after a routine bureaucratic rotation, hundreds 
of headmasters filed a police report alleging that an unnamed official was 
soliciting bribes in exchange for a promise of exemption from reassignment. 
The headmasters then formally complained to the district assembly, where 
Milwan’s foes enthusiastically took up the complaint.36 In March 2009, four 
assembly factions proposed a special investigation (hak angket) of the 
reassignments. Elya Rosa was prominent among the protesting assembly 
members.37 The school headmaster controversy badly hurt Milwan. Not only 
did he pay out bribes to quiet his critics in the assembly, but the controversy 
damaged Adlina’s reputation because she was allegedly involved in the 
extortion. At least one former assembly member believes that the scandal hurt 
Adlina in the district election the following year.38 
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 Routine administrative business within the district assembly also 
presented a pretext to criticize Milwan. In May 2009, a special committee 
(Pansus, Panitia Khusus) was tasked to investigate the executive’s annual 
work report (LKPj). In its findings, it complained that every year the executive 
was late submitting a proposed budget.39 Milwan attempted to deflect the 
criticism to the bureaucracy. He delivered a speech berating civil servants on 
National Awareness Day (Hari Kesadaran Nasional) in July. He blamed them 
for the corruption and failing to complete their duties punctually. As Milwan 
grew increasingly isolated, he lashed out at the one institution he still 
directed.40 
In August, the assembly deliberated to pass approval of 2008 budget 
spending. Elya Rosa was particularly outspoken on this occasion. She objected 
to Milwan’s decision not to re-tender rollover projects, as Ramli had in April. 
She called attention to budget items with large amounts of unspent funds, and, 
she complained that social programs were administered by the district 
women’s organization (PKK, Pemberdayaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga), which 
was chaired by Adlina.41 
 Even the completion of one of Milwan’s signature construction 
projects in November 2009 prompted criticism. After 13 years of delays and 
accidents, the district finally completed what was billed as North Sumatra’s 
biggest and best sports complex. The opening was received with as many jeers 
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as cheers, however, because of the project’s enormous cost totaling Rp 14.9 
billion (US$1.6 million). The week it opened, cracks appeared in the back wall 
of the building.42 Even with the sports complex complete, two other mega-
projects were still behind schedule. A market complex and a bus terminal 
would not be finished before the 2010 election. On 21 May 2010, less than one 
month before the election, activists representing the Islamic Students 
Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam) demonstrated in front of the 
Milwan’s office to demand completion of the projects. Milwan’s mega-
projects, hugely profitable in terms of graft, became major sources of 
embarrassment that voters remembered on polling day.43 
 
Money Politics and Mobilization in the 2010 District Election 
The contest between the competing factions of the mafia was 
ultimately resolved by the 2010 district election. Milwan, having already 
served two terms, advanced Adlina together with a Pujakesuma functionary 
named Trisno. Fredy’s faction chose to support a respected medical doctor 
named Tigor Siregar and the aforementioned Suhari Pane. Each side 
conducted campaign strategy to take greatest advantage of its organizational 
sources of power. Milwan’s approach exemplified “money politics.” He 
expended billions of rupiah on party nominations, voter handouts and 
favorable press coverage. He counted on his organizational allies—
Pujakesuma and the bureaucracy—to deliver their constituencies on election 
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day. By contrast, the opposition mobilized a network of campaign volunteers 
that brought thousands of new voters to the polls. The strategy built on 
existing youth group and NGO networks and employed their activists in the 
organizational effort. Fredy and his youth group allies capably deployed 
negative campaign tactics, as well. The mobilization effort paid off for the 
opposition, as Tigor-Suhari won the election with 53% of the vote compared 
to 38% for Adlina.44 
 
Adlina’s Campaign 
 At the outset, Milwan and Adlina were strong favorites. Milwan began 
making preparations long before the official campaign season began in March 
2010. Adlina’s position as the chair of the women’s organization allowed her 
to begin her campaign a year early. Since the organization administered social 
projects, Adlina toured villages distributing oil palm and corn seedlings, 
fertilizer and mosquito nets.45 She passed out headscarves and sacks of rice 
marked with a heart, her campaign symbol, and accompanied by a message 
from Ibu PKK (Madame PKK).46 
 While Adlina campaigned, Milwan moved to sideline Tigor. In March 
2009, Milwan removed Tigor from his position as director of Rantauprapat 
Public Hospital.47 Tigor’s new position was as technical advisor to the director 
of the district health department. While the position was a step up the 
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bureaucratic pay-scale, it commanded no real responsibility and was widely 
understood as a step toward retirement. Not satisfied, Milwan also tried to 
close Tigor’s private internal medical practice but failed when he could not 
invalidate the office lease. Tigor made the most of the unwanted dismissal by 
spending the rest of the year traveling around the district performing free 
circumcisions. He believes the volunteer work increased his popularity and 
earned him votes in 2010.48 
 Milwan expected much from the bureaucracy. Civil servants in the 
lower levels of the bureaucracy, such as ward (Lurah), sub-district (Camat) 
and popularly elected village leaders (kepala desa), were of particular 
importance. They exercised de facto discretion over the distribution of 
government development programs within their jurisdictions, and thus had the 
capacity to politicize state patronage. Government programs, for example a 
free identity card processing scheme, became campaign events.49 In addition, 
at least one village chief attempted to prevent Tigor and his team from 
entering his village.50 Sub-district leaders influenced the composition of 
election logistics committees (Panitia Pemilihan Kecamatan, PPK), allowing 
them to ensure that Milwan’s partisans oversaw election preparations, 
logistics, and vote-counting. The sub-district office was able to veto 
undesirable candidates because it composed a short-list of candidates from 
which the district election commission selected the committees.51 However, 
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there is little evidence that the logistics committees made a concerted effort to 
manipulate the election results, despite some reports of problems at the polls.52 
 The primary tool for manipulating the bureaucracy was the executive’s 
right to reassign civil servants. Between March and May 2009, Milwan 
reassigned or confirmed nearly 300 civil servants at all levels of the 
bureaucracy, from the district secretary (sekretaris daerah, sekda) to village 
heads.53 On 15 March 2010, he fired one sub-district administrator and 
confirmed four more village heads.54 By doing so, he filled the bureaucracy’s 
most strategic positions with his supporters in time for the election. It also 
warned opponents that he was willing to reassign uncooperative civil servants. 
Many sources confirm that throughout the campaign period Milwan threatened 
to reassign or deactivate civil servants who attended Tigor’s campaign events 
or expressed sympathy for his candidacy.55 
 By her own count, 28 political parties backed Adlina’s campaign.56 
Some of the parties, however, limited their support to nomination only and 
declined to deliver their constituencies. Milwan may have anticipated the 
problem early in the campaign when he challenged them, saying “The success 
of this campaign will reflect the self-worth (harga diri) of the parties, because 
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the coalition supporting Adlina-Trisno is very large.”57 Party loyalties 
nevertheless remained divided, with Golkar as a case in point. Fredy and Elya 
Rosa both held local party office, Fredy as deputy chair of the board and Elya 
as chair of the assembly. While Fredy and Elya criticized Adlina and Milwan 
in the name of Golkar, provincial officers including Governor Syamsul Arifin 
campaigned on their behalf.58 In all likelihood, local activists from Golkar as 
well as other parties felt little loyalty to Adlina because Milwan purchased the 
nominations by making financial donations to central and provincial party 
boards. 
One consequence of Adlina’s party strategy was that it became 
difficult for Tigor to fashion a coalition of parties representing 15% of the 
electorate. Adlina’s coalition included the major parties Demokrat, Golkar, 
PDI-P, Welfare and Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) and 
National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional) and accounted for 35 out of 
50 seats in the assembly.59 Tigor was left to fashion a coalition around PPP 
that delivered the minimum of 8 assembly seats.60 It was rumored, 
furthermore, that Adlina’s team tried and failed to lure away one of Tigor’s 
supporting parties at the eleventh hour.61 If the gambit had succeeded Tigor 
might have been disqualified for failing to meet the nomination threshold. A 
corollary to the strategy was to support a third candidacy. Irfan, a retired civil 
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servant, ran as an independent. He campaigned little and performed poorly at 
the polls. Nevertheless, had Milwan prevented Tigor from registering as a 
candidate, Irfan would have provided legitimacy to an uncontested election, 
much as “escorting candidates” (calon pendamping) did during the New 
Order.62 Even after Tigor was nominated, Milwan contributed financially to 
Irfan’s campaign in an effort to divide Tigor’s support base.63 
 In addition to leaning on the bureaucracy and political parties, the 
campaign reached out to civil society via ethnic associations and the press. Of 
the ethnic associations, Pujakesuma was most important because Javanese 
comprise 44.8% of the total population in Labuhan Batu and its derivative 
districts.64 However, just as Aspinall, Dettman and Warburten demonstrated 
with respect to Medan’s 2010 election, Javanese did not vote as a single 
bloc.65 The much smaller Chinese community was similarly divided, despite 
proclamations to the contrary.66 Milwan paid the local newspapers to shower 
favorable coverage on Adlina’s campaign. The partisanship of the local Metro 
Rantau was particularly bald, but it was not alone.67 The editor of at least one 
major newspaper refused to run any campaign stories unless the candidate 
paid, as he or she might pay for advertising. Since Tigor chose to spend his 
                                                            
62 Malley, “Regions: Centralization and Resistance,” 86-7. 
63 Personal interview, Rantauprapat, 7 September 2010. 
64 Batubara, “Evaluasi Hasi Penyelenggaraan Pemilu 2009,” 2. 
65 Aspinall, et al, “When Religion Trumps Ethnicity,” 42. 
66 Compare “Etnis Tionghoa Dukung HATI,” Metro Rantau, 21 May 2010; Zainul, 
“Penasehat PSMTI Labuhanbatu Calonkan Diri Jadi Bupati,” Ini Medan Bung; accessed 28 
July 2011. 




limited funds elsewhere, his team had to discuss newsworthy topics to get 
coverage that reporters could file as news rather than campaign-related.68 
 The linchpin of Milwan and Adlina’s campaign was the attempt to buy 
votes directly. Their generosity took many forms. As early as 2009, Adlina 
handed out money for transport to health workers, as gifts for teachers and as 
honorariums for campaign workers.69 During the campaign proper, she paid 
motorcycle taxi drivers to escort campaign processions.70 And like campaign 
teams throughout North Sumatra, her team passed out Rp 50,000 notes (about 
US$6) on the eve of the election in what is commonly called “the attack at 
dawn” (serangan fajar).71 
Add all of the campaign expenditures up, and Milwan and Adlina’s 
campaign cost an extraordinary amount of money. Local observers enjoy 
speculating as to the amount, with guesses ranging wildly from Rp 10 billion 
to 100 billion (US$1.1 million-11 million). Regardless of the actual amount, it 
seems clear that Milwan and Adlina outspent Tigor in a classic campaign of 
money politics. From party nominations to vote-buying, they believed their 
money would purchase support. The case would confirm Hadiz’s criticism that 
                                                            
68 Personal interview, Rantauprapat, 31 August 2010. 
69 “Ketua Penggerak PKK Labuhanbatu Serahkan Uang Transport Kepada Ratusan Kader 
Poyandu se-Bilah Hilir,” Harian Sinar Indonesia Baru, unknown date, September or 
November 2009; “Ketua TP PKK: Jangan Sampai Labuhanbatu Dipimpin Preman,” Harian 
Sinar Indonesia Baru, unknown date, November 2009; Zainul, “Hj Adlina Milwan Bagi-bagi 
Duit di Acara HUT Guru,” Ini Medan Bung; accessed 28 July 2011; “Adelina (sic) T Milwan 
Bagi-bagi Duit kepada 1.500 Anggota Tim Sukses di Bilah Hilir Labuhanbatu,” Harian Sinar 
Indonesia Baru, unknown date, August 2009. 
70 “Ribuan Abang Betor Rantauprapat Ikut Pasang Taruhan Piala Dunia, Uangnya dari Upah 
Kampanye?” Harian Sinar Indonesia Baru, 14 June 2010. 
71 “Tigor Siregar-Suhari Pane Unggul Di Labuhanbatu,” Harian Waspada, 17 June 2010. 
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Indonesian democracy is vulnerable to elite capture through money politics, 
except that in this case, Adlina lost.72 
 
Tigor’s Campaign 
Tigor’s campaign strategy focused on face to face contact between the 
candidates, campaign volunteers and voters. In this way, the team attempted to 
bypass the local press, which Milwan had ensured would favor Adlina.73 Tigor 
and his running mate Suhari stumped, but the number of people they 
encountered touring was naturally limited. To extend the message, the 
campaign team developed a large network of volunteers. The goal was to 
recruit 20 volunteers in every village and ward in the entire district. The 
campaign team placed five operatives in every sub-district for the purpose of 
recruiting volunteers. At the end of the campaign, Tigor boasted that 12,000 
volunteers had registered with his team and worked on the campaign.74 These 
volunteers became responsible for the campaign in their respective villages. 
They arranged logistics and extended invitations to the candidates to make a 
campaign stop in the village.75 
Tigor’s plan to establish chapters of campaign volunteers in every 
town and village followed the model of North Sumatra’s youth organizations, 
and Tigor’s campaign team interpenetrated those organizations. The most 
important of them was Ramli’s MPI, but members of other organizations such 
as Youth Force for Indonesian Renewal (Angkatan Muda Pembaharuan 
                                                            
72 Vedi Hadiz, “Power and Politics in North Sumatra: The Uncompleted Reformasi,” in Local 
Power and Politics in Indonesia, Aspinall and Fealy, eds.: 119-131. 
73 Personal interview, Rantauprapat, 11 June 2010. 
74 Personal interview, Rantauprapat, 17 June 2010. 
75 Personal interview, Rantauprapat, 11 June 2010. 
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Indonesia) and the Labuhan Batu Batak Youth Forum (Forum Pemuda Batak 
Labuhanbatu) also cooperated with Ramli and Fredy in support of Tigor’s 
campaign.76 It is very likely that the members of youth organizations were the 
operatives recruiting village volunteers. However, their work was easier 
because Tigor and Suhari were well-known in Labuhan Batu’s villages 
because of their charitable work there, Tigor as a doctor and Suhari as a 
farmer’s advocate. 
In the villages, Tigor presented a populist agenda.77 He talked about 
improving health services and education, and his bread-and-butter issue was 
identity cards. He insisted that the bureaucracy should process these free of 
charge and promised that if elected he would see to it that they were.78 The 
clever promise appealed to all classes of voters and indirectly criticized the 
lower level bureaucrats upon whom Adlina campaign’s depended, since 
village and ward leaders were the ones who processed identity cards and 
collected processing fees. 
Tigor’s backers, Fredy, Ramli and their associates, also waged an 
aggressively negative campaign. One early attack against Adlina accused her 
of submitting a false high school diploma to the district election commission.79 
All executive candidates must hold a high school diploma, so the allegation 
simultaneously challenged her right to run for office and defamed her 
character. The rumor claimed that Adlina married Milwan at a young age and 
                                                            
76 Personal interview, Rantuaprapat, 31 August 2010; “Tigor Siregar-Suhari Pane Unggul Di 
Labuhanbatu,” Harian Waspada, 17 June 2010. 
77 Zulkifli, “Mengawal Jargon Perubahan Pemerintahan ala dr Tigor-Suhari,” Metro Rantau, 2 
September 2010. 
78 Personal interview, Rantauprapat, 17 June 2010. 
79 “Ratusan Warga Unjuk Rsa (sic) Minta KPU Labuhanbatu Benar-benar Verifikasi Berkas 
Balon Bupati,” Harian Sinar Indonesia Baru, 13 April 2010. 
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as a result failed to complete middle or high school. Ramli himself traveled to 
Adlina’s home province of West Sumatra to interview the principal at her 
former middle school and returned claiming to have proof that Adlina’s 
diploma was a forgery.80 The attack succeeded. Even after the election 
commission confirmed the authenticity of Adlina’s diploma, doubt remained 
in the minds of many voters about Adlina’s qualifications for public office.81 
In addition, the opposition taunted Adlina by hanging insulting banners around 
the district, some of which were “signed” with Fredy’s name. One read, 
“Thank you Mrs. Adlina for the rice and money, but we still prefer Tigor.”82 
Finally, Fredy and Ramli’s thugs monitored the campaign activities of 
Adlina’s team, and on election day they detained a sub-district and a ward 
administrator and accused them of distributing money during the “attack at 
dawn.”83 
The election results proved that Tigor, Suhari, Fredy, Elya Rosa, Ramli 
and the others successfully mobilized voters to oppose Adlina and Milwan. In 
2005, 83,000 people voted against Milwan in the part of Labuhan Batu that 
was not partitioned in 2009.84 In 2010, Tigor’s ticket received over 100,000 
votes, meaning that his campaign attracted almost 28,000 voters who had not 
previously opposed Milwan.85 Many of them were first time voters, as 21,000 
                                                            
80 Personal interview, Rantauprapat, 31 August 2010. 
81 Personal interview, Rantauprapat, 7 September 2010. 
82 “Cabup Labuhan Batu ‘Perang Baliho,’” Metro Rantau, 31 May 2010. 
83 “Bagi-bagi Uang ke Pemilih, Warga Arak Lurah, Kepling dan RT ke Polres Labuhanbatu: 
Pilkada Labuhanbatu Diprotes,” Harian Sinar Indonesia Baru, 17 June 2010. 
84 KPU Labuhanbatu, “Lampiran 1: Rekapitulasi Hasil Penghitungan Suara Pilkada 2005,” in 
Laporan: Penyelenggaraan Pemilihan 2005: Appendix 1. 
85 KPU Labuhanbatu, “Rekapitulasi Jumlah Pemilih, TPS dan Surat Suara,” 18 June 2010. 
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more people voted in 2010 than 2005. The remainder was likely swing voters 
who abandoned Milwan. Adlina lost 16,000 votes compared to his 2005 total. 
As successful as the mobilization effort was on election day, it placed 
great strain on the opposition coalition afterwards. Campaign promises had 
raised hopes so high, and the opposition encompassed so many diverse groups, 
that when Tigor and Suhari were inaugurated disillusionment set in almost 
immediately. The criticism focused on the incompatible interests of the Fredy 
and the business contractors, on the one hand, who intended to reconstitute the 
mafia, and the villagers, volunteers and voters, on the other, who hoped for 
efficient implementation of Tigor’s populist programs. 
Tigor’s fate was tied to Fredy and the mafia because he owed his 
position to them. The opening ceremony for Milwan’s mega-project, Padang 
Bulan Bus Terminal, illustrated the power of the “new” mafia. After 12 years 
of construction, the new facility would increase district revenues, improve 
traffic flow and beautify Rantauprapat. The opening was the most important 
event of Tigor’s young administration. Having been humiliated by the 
campaign against his wife, Milwan did not attend though he had managed the 
project for years. Instead, Tigor and deputy Suhari proudly presided. Standing 
beside them were Fredy, Elya Rosa and Ramli.86 
However, it is unlikely that the mafia will maintain such a united 
image for long. Having mobilized so many volunteers, it will be very difficult 
for Tigor to satisfy all of his constituents. The first cracks appeared on 1 
October 2010, when a scandal erupted because Tigor was accused of 
pressuring the oceans and fisheries agency (Diskanla, Dinas Perikanan dan 
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Kelautan) to award a project tender to one of his campaign supporters.87 Two 
of his former admirers angrily responded by comparing Tigor to Milwan.88 
Others whispered about Tigor’s untrustworthy advisors, evoking the metaphor 
of a manipulative steward (panglima talam) who pays lip service to the lord 
but manages the estate in a self-serving fashion.89 Milwan’s mafia collapsed 
when state patronage proved insufficient to satisfy both him and Fredy. While 
the spoils of office have remained constant, the pressure on the mafia is 
greater than ever because the new administration must answer to 10,000 
campaign volunteers who mobilized to defeat Milwan. It will be extremely 
difficult to maintain such a large coalition. 
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Tapanuli Selatan: A Mafia against a Machine 
 
Tapanuli Selatan’s politics during the post-reform era illustrate the full 
life cycle, so to speak, of a local mafia. The case shows how decentralization 
reform allowed mafias to emerge, and how counter-reform contributed to their 
decline and eventual eclipse by a party machine. Shortly after the collapse of 
the New Order, a “timber mafia” coalesced in Tapanuli Selatan by 
monopolizing the lucrative logging and plantation concessions that Law No. 
22/1999 appeared to place under the authority of local governments. The 
mafia came to exercise a great deal of influence over many local institutions, 
particularly the executive and legislative branches of government, the 
judiciary, the election commission and Golkar’s district chapter. Even after 
national legislation revoked local authority to manage forests, the mafia 
remained powerful without its raison d’etre because it retained its institutional 
allies. In this way, it resisted the encroachment of the Golkar machine for 
several years before finally succumbing. In order to prevail, the machine 
backed subdivision of Tapanuli Selatan district in order to marginalize the 
mafia’s voting base while mobilizing its own constituency in Sipirok town. 
The district is among North Sumatra’s most remote, rural and poorest. 
Despite rich forests, mineral deposits and plantations, Tapanuli Selatan’s per 
capita income remains low, at Rp 7.2 million (US$790) in 2007.1 Foreign and 
national firms dominate these main industries, leaving little opportunity for 
local business to develop. Consequently, social organizations are not as well 
                                                            
1 BPS Sumut, “Sumatera Utara in Figures 2009,” Table 11.3.3. 
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established as elsewhere in the province. Labor organizations are weak and the 
youth groups have few outposts in rural areas. Customary associations and 
clan affiliations are the most influential social networks. 
District geography extends from the highlands of the Bukit Barisan 
mountains to the coastal lowlands on the shores of the Indian Ocean, and 
agricultural products match the topography in variety. The highlands are 
cultivated in wet rice, the intermediate zones in rubber and the lowlands in 
palm oil. Before it was divided into three districts in 2007, Tapanuli Selatan 
ranked among the top producers in the province of each of these commodities 
due to its enormous size.2 But natural resources are the prize of the economy. 
Before 2007, the district had the most forest land in North Sumatra by far.3 
Besides timber, forested areas also contain gold deposits as well as endangered 
orangutans, but both the forests and fauna are disappearing fast. 
The history of plantation labor in Tapanuli Selatan is quite different 
from Labuhan Batu or Serdang Bedagai because large-scale estates production 
there started much later. The laboring population is composed of recent 
migrants from Java, Nias and Tapanuli and it is organized differently than in 
the traditional plantation belt. On many estates, workers participate in a 
cooperative whereby each family receives two hectares of land on the 
condition that it sells its produce only to the concession holder. Because the 
estates industry was not yet established at the time, it is likely that anti-
                                                            
2 For rice, see BPS Sumut, “Sumatera Utara in Figures 2009,” Table 5.1.3. For plantations, see 
Disbun Sumut, “Rekapitulasi Luas Areal dan Produksi Komoditi Kelapa Sawit,” and 
“Rekapitulasi Luas Areal dan Produksi Komoditi Karet.” 
3 Surat Keputusan Menhut No. 44/Menhut-II/2005. 
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communist violence during 1965-66 was less bloody in Tapanuli Selatan than 
along the east coast. 
 
Decentralization and the Rise of the Timber Mafia 
In several publications, John McCarthy has described the operations of 
“’timber mafias’” composed of “clientelist coalitions” that manage lucrative 
logging activities in forested districts of Indonesia.4 During the dying days of 
the New Order, a mafia in Aceh Tenggara district linked the executive with 
“forestry staff working for the National Park, police (Polres) and army 
personnel (Kodim), local government officials, the judiciary and local 
religious leaders (imam).”5 In the years immediately following 
decentralization reform, “district actors and administrators had exceptional 
opportunities to gain benefits” from timber resources because they gained 
authority to grant logging permits and land concessions.6 In Central 
Kalimantan’s Barito Selatan district, the executive issued logging and transit 
permits to political allies and wealthy logging conglomerates. Members of the 
district assembly, journalists and NGOs accepted pay-offs from loggers, as did 
a host of law enforcement agencies, including the police, the military and 
forestry officials. In addition, an estimated 60 assembly members were 
“directly involved in timber enterprises.”7 
                                                            
4 John McCarthy, “Power and Interest on Sumatra’s Rainforest Frontier: Clientelist Coalitions, 
Illegal Logging and Conservation in the Alas Valley,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 33.1 
(February 2002): 93. 
5 Ibid., 94. 
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Kalimantan,” in Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia, Henk 
Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken, eds. (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007): 153. 
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Evidence suggests that a similar mafia was active in Tapanuli Selatan 
at the same time. Certainly timber represented a very valuable resource present 
in the district. Shane Barter reported that in North Sumatra, logging 
concessions granted by the district government increased “a thousand fold” 
after 1998 and he identified Saleh Harahap, executive of Tapanuli Selatan, as a 
primary culprit.8 North Sumatra’s most sensational illegal logging case 
commenced during this period in Tapanuli Selatan when D.L. Sitorus 
opportunistically took possession of tens of thousands of hectares of forest 
reserve in 1998.9 Taking advantage of the breakdown in central authority, he 
bypassed the Forest Ministry and negotiated directly with traditional leaders 
who claimed to exercise customary rights (hak ulayat) over the land. He 
converted the forest to palm oil, attracting a workforce to clear and plant by 
giving 2 Ha of land to members of a cooperative (Koperasi Bukit Harapan, 
Mount Hope Cooperative) which sold exclusively to him. The cooperative 
cultivated; Sitorus obtained documentation of land tenure.10 This he procured 
locally, in all likelihood dealing directly with district level officials at the local 
forestry agency (Dinas Kehutanan) and the national land tenure board (Badan 
Pertanahan Nasional, BPN), and, of course, with the district executive.11 
According to McCarthy, district officials abruptly lost their power to 
regulate logging in 2002. He cites the newly autonomous police force and a 
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government regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah No. 34/2002) that restored 
authority over timber permits and concessions to the Ministry of Forestry as 
the two main causes. As a result of these developments, district governments 
in Central Kalimantan relinquished control of timber rents to the provincial 
police and numerous district officials faced prosecution in the provincial 
courts.12 The provincial police, attorney general’s office and the Ministry of 
Forestry similarly initiated a series of high profile illegal logging cases in 
North Sumatra. In 2005, the attorney general charged D.L. Sitorus with 
corruption and illegally converting forest land.13 The following year, Adelin 
Lis, whose family owned several companies with vast concessions in Tapanuli 
Tengah, Tapanuli Selatan and Mandailing Natal districts, was accused of 
logging Batang Gadis National Park.14 And in 2005, the Minister of Forestry, 
M.S. Kaban, named Saleh Harahap an illegal logging suspect shortly before 
the latter’s death.15 
 
Stalemate: The 2005 District Elections 
Already strained because of the pressure from provincial law 
enforcement officials and the Ministry of Forestry, the mafia collapsed 
completely during the 2005 direct district elections. The incumbent executive, 
the chair of the assembly and the district secretary—all erstwhile allies—
declared candidacies during an extremely contentious campaign. D.L. Sitorus, 
                                                            
12 John McCarty, “Sold down the river,” 169-172. 
13 L.R. Baskoro, Danto, Agung Wijaya and Hambali Batubara, “Penjarahan Kayu: Sewindu 
untuk Sang Penantang,” Majalah Tempo, 7 August 2006. 
14 Ramidi, Hambali Batubara and Maria Hasugian, “Setelah Hutan Habis Ditebang,” Majalah 
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arguably the most important businessman in the district, supported yet another 
candidate.16 Thus four out of ten candidates who registered with the local 
election commission originated from the timber mafia. 
The chair of the assembly, Bachrum Harahap, was the favorite to win 
the election and rebuild the coalition. A real estate broker among other things, 
Bachrum understood the value of land concessions. He grew rich during his 
time in the assembly and developed a loyal network of followers by directing 
projects to his friends.17 He also chaired the local chapter of Golkar, an 
important position because the party dominated both branches of local 
government. The executive, Saleh Harahap, had long been a party member. In 
the assembly, Golkar held 14 out of 45 seats after winning nearly 30% of the 
vote in the 2004 legislative elections. By comparison, the second leading 
party, PPP, controlled only 6 seats.18 
Bachrum’s leadership of Golkar seemed to assure him of the party’s 
nomination, so Saleh Harahap sought out other parties to endorse his 
candidacy. He asked his district secretary, Rahudman Harahap, to approach 
PDI-P to secure its nomination. The opportunistic secretary deceived Saleh 
and persuaded PDI-P to support himself instead.19 As a result, when Saleh 
registered with the election committee, it disqualified him and announced 
Rahudman as the rightful PDI-P candidate. Saleh died a few months later, but 
                                                            
16 The candidate, not coincidently, was a district-level official at the national land tenure board 
(BPN). 
17 Personal interview, Gunung Tua, 27 October 2010. 
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Online, 29 June 2009; accessed 8 March 2011. 
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not before exacting revenge. He reported Rahudman to the provincial police 
for embezzling civil servant bonuses. The case did not prevent Rahudman 
from running for executive because it took years to investigate, but it did 
illustrate how acrimoniously the mafia collapsed.20 
 Even though Saleh conceded Golkar’s support, Bachrum still almost 
lost the nomination. The threat came not from local rivals but from Golkar’s 
central and provincial leadership. That leadership preferred a pairing of Herry 
Siregar, the incumbent deputy executive, and Chaidir Ritonga, Golkar’s 
deputy treasurer for the province. In addition to holding a provincial party 
position, Chaidir was the son-in-law of senior Golkar politician Burhanuddin 
Napitupulu, who at the time was Sumatra area coordinator for the Golkar 
Central Leadership Board (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat) in Jakarta.21 The 
leadership knew that Bachrum would never sign a nomination letter for a rival, 
so it also moved to sack Bachrum from his position as district party chair. 
 When Bachrum realized that the party convention would not give him 
the nomination, he acted quickly to thwart Golkar’s intentions. At 8pm on 
Wednesday, 6 April 2005, two days before the registration deadline, he 
appeared at the election commission’s office in the town of Padang Sidimpuan 
and registered as the candidate for Golkar. His paperwork was in order and he 
presented all the required signatures: from himself as party chair, from the 
party secretary, and from both candidates on the ticket, himself and Tongku 
Palit Hasibuan.22 
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 Two days later, a delegation from Medan came to register the 
convention’s choice for the Golkar nomination. They presented a letter 
recalling Bachrum from his position as district party chair as well as all the 
required signatures based on the new party hierarchy. At first, the election 
commission was reluctant to accept the nomination because Golkar had 
already submitted one nomination, but the delegation persuaded it to process 
both nominations and promised to await the outcome of the candidate 
verification process. It was a decision the election commissioners came to 
regret.23 
 After the verification process, the election commission declared 
Bachrum the legitimate Golkar candidate based on a technicality: the letter 
sacking him was not signed by Golkar’s provincial chairperson.24 Instead, the 
deputy chair had signed the letter because the chair was abroad visiting Mecca 
for the rite of Umroh at the time of the convention. The matter was not settled 
so easily, however. Herry Siregar and Chaidir Ritonga successfully appealed 
the decision to the state administrative court (Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara) 
in Medan, which upheld the validity of the letter. This meant that the election 
commission still had to choose between two Golkar nominated candidates. 
 Election regulations stipulated that in the event that one party 
nominated more than one candidate, the party’s Central Board had the final 
authority to designate the candidate. At the advice of the provincial election 
commission, the election commission sent a letter to Golkar on 2 May 2005 
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requesting clarification,25 and a few days later the commission sent a 
delegation of three to Jakarta to meet with the central board face to face. The 
board declared that it supported Herry Siregar and Chaidir Ritonga as Golkar’s 
candidates in Tapsel. Upon returning to Padang Sidimpuan, the chair of the 
election commission, Erwin Syarifuddin Harahap, and one member, Fitri 
Leniwati Harahap, signed a letter declaring Herry and Chaidir as Golkar’s 
rightful nominee.26 
 At this point, the election commission split. The three commissioners 
who had not signed the letter called a plenary meeting at which they used their 
majority to reach a number of decisions. First, they declared the letter invalid 
because it had not been previously agreed upon in a plenary session.27 Second, 
they repudiated the letter they had sent requesting clarification from Golkar’s 
central board.28 Third, they voted to endorse Bachrum as the Golkar candidate. 
Fourth, they voted to replace the chair with one of their own, Mustar Edi 
Hutasuhut. Finally, they resolved to press charges of forgery and misconduct 
against Erwin and Fitri for their actions in support of Herry and Chaidir’s 
candidacy.29 
 News reports, local gossip, and the absurdity of some of the decisions 
taken by the group of three election commissioners all suggested that they 
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were biased in favor of Bachrum.30 Whether or not they were bribed, their 
loyalty to Bachrum paid off as a wise career choice. Two of them 
accompanied him to the new district Padang Lawas Utara, where in 2008 
Bachrum became the first elected district executive. M. Aman Siregar joined 
the election commission there31 while Amril Hakim Harahap received a civil 
service appointment in the education agency (Dinas Pendidikan).32 Mustar 
Edi, meanwhile, retained his newly acquired position as chair of Tapanuli 
Selatan’s election commission for a second term that commenced in December 
2008. By contrast, Bachrum’s opponents Erwin and Fitri retired from public 
life at the conclusion of their terms. Fitri started an NGO that assists battered 
women and Erwin opened a restaurant.33 
 Bachrum reportedly punished opponents as effectively as he rewarded 
supporters, and Mustar Edi, M. Aman and Amril Hakim may have been 
motivated by fear as much as ambition. Despite pressure from the provincial 
election commission, they refused to drop the charges against Erwin and Fitri. 
The trial began after the election and after one hearing Erwin and Fitri were 
held in contempt of court for failing to appear. They had done so on the advice 
of their lawyer. They spent the duration of the trial, nine weeks, in jail. They 
were eventually found guilty of forgery, the lesser charge, and sentenced to 
time served.34 The vindictive nature of the charges and the harshness of the 
contempt finding again suggest that the court was biased in favor of Bachrum. 
                                                            
30 “Konflik Jelang Pesta Rakyat,” Media Indonesia, 6 May 2005. 
31 “Pelantikan 23 KPU Kabupaten/Kota, 5 Menyusul,” Berita Sore, 28 October 2008; accessed 
31 July 2011. 
32 “Anggota KPU Tapsel Tinggal 4 Orang,” Waspada Online, 27 June 2008; accessed 31 July 
2011. 




 Throughout the nomination process, Bachrum demonstrated his 
influence over local institutions. Within the district branch of Golkar, he 
sidelined the incumbent district executive and persuaded the party secretary to 
cooperate with him to seize the nomination. The district election commission 
took his side against the recommendations of the provincial commission. It is 
likely that he influenced the decisions taken by the local court. With his local 
influence, he outsmarted and outmuscled the provincial and central Golkar 
leadership and seized the nomination. 
 Despite his success, Bachrum lost the election. On election day, 27 
June 2005, he finished second with 22% of the vote. Ongku Hasibuan, a 
mining engineer nominated by PKS and Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National 
Awakening Party), won the election by a comfortable margin with 33%.35 
Local observers have little doubt that the nomination fight cost Bachrum the 
election. During the controversy, Golkar activists drifted away to other 
candidates.36 Bachrum lost time on the campaign trail. The dispute cast doubt 
on the legitimacy of his candidacy as well as the election itself. The week 
before the election, no less a person than Agung Laksono, Golkar national 
deputy chair and chair of the National assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, 
DPR), publicly declared the Tapanuli Selatan election “legally flawed.”37 
Golkar’s internal struggle over the 2005 nomination culminated in a draw, 
with both sides losing. Bachrum prevented the central leadership from 
                                                            
35 KPU Sumut, “Rekapitulasi Jumlah Pemilih, PPK PPS, TPS, Dan Hasil Perolehan Suara 
Masing-Masing Pasangan Calon dalam Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Kabupaten/Kota Tahun 
2005 di Provinsi Sumatera Utara (Tahap 1),” no date; accessed at www.kpusumut.org, 13 
April 2010. 
36 “Konflik Jelang Pesta Rakyat,” Media Indonesia, 6 May 2005. 
37 “Mantan Ketua KPUD: Pilkada Tapsel Cacat Hukum,” Harian Waspada, 29 June 2005. 
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nominating its preferred candidate, while the central leadership prevented 
Bachrum from winning the election. 
 
The Mafia Counterattacks: Subdividing the District 
 Following his election loss, Bachrum immediately set to work drawing 
the lines for Tapanuli Selatan’s next political battle. During the lame duck 
period before Ongku’s inauguration, Bachrum used his influence as chair of 
the district assembly to pass a proposal to subdivide Tapanuli Selatan.38 The 
proposal purported to fulfill the promise of a 1992 resolution to divide 
Tapanuli Selatan into four independent districts and a municipality.39 
Bachrum’s plan called for the creation of three new districts, called Angkola 
Sipirok, Padang Lawas and Tapanuli Selatan. 
Bachrum’s bill proposed to make Tapanuli Selatan, where Ongku 
would administer, smaller and poorer than the other two districts. Of Tapanuli 
Selatan’s 28 sub-districts, Angkola Sipirok was to administer 11, Padang 
Lawas 10 and Tapanuli Selatan 7. Similarly, at 140,978, Tapanuli Selatan’s 
proposed population was roughly half the size of Angkola Sipirok’s and two-
thirds that of Padang Lawas. Furthermore, the sub-districts allocated to 
Tapanuli Selatan were more remote and less developed. For example, they 
contained only 17% of the original district’s elementary schools, 20% of its 
road infrastructure and 7% of its cell phone coverage.40 Most importantly, the 
proposal reserved much of Tapanuli Selatan’s most productive plantation land 
                                                            
38 S Togi Ritonga, “Wujudkan Pemekaran, Drs Bachrum Harahap Pantas Pimpin Paluta 
(Bagian I),” Harian Mandiri, 8 September 2008; accessed 11 March 2011. 
39 Chaidir Ritonga, “Akhirnya Tapsel Mekar,” Waspada Online, 24 July 2007; accessed 19 
July 2011. 
40 Andy Riza Hidayat, “Menunggu Pemekaran Tapanuli Selatan?” Kompas, 20 April 2007. 
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to Padang Lawas district, where Bachrum’s base of support resided. Bachrum 
had intentions to govern this new district, and in 2008 he would become its 
executive after it had been realized with a slightly different name, Padang 
Lawas Utara.41 
After Bachrum’s proposal passed in Tapanuli Selatan’s assembly on 28 
July 2005, it quickly worked its way through the North Sumatra provincial 
government. Once the provincial assembly approved it, Governor Rudolf 
Pardede endorsed it on 29 November 2005 and sent it to Jakarta, where Agung 
Laksono and the rest of the national assembly took a full year to write it into a 
bill.42 The respite gave Bachrum’s opponents an opportunity to plan a 
counterattack. 
When President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono placed 16 district 
subdivision bills on the agendas of the national assembly, Ministry of Home 
Affairs and Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (Kementerian Hukum dan 
Hak Asasi Manusia), Ongku seized the opportunity to submit an alternative.43 
On 1 February 2007 he wrote the president to explain that if it passed, 
Bachrum’s plan would at once impoverish the district named Tapanuli Selatan 
and burden it with the added responsibility of financially and administratively 
supporting the new districts until they became fully autonomous.44 As a 
solution he proposed that Tapanuli Selatan administer the eleven sub-districts 
                                                            
41 “Bachrum Harahap/Riskon Unggul di Paluta, Basyrah Lubis/Ali Sutan Harahap Unggul di 
Palas,” Harian Sinar Indonesia Baru, 22 October 2008. 
42 S Togi Ritonga, “Wujudkan Pemekaran, Drs Bachrum Harahap Pantas Pimpin Paluta 
(Bagian I),” Harian Mandiri, 8 September 2008; accessed 11 March 2011. 
43 He did so in Presidential Letter (Surat President) No. R.01/Pres/01/2007 dated 2 January 
2007. 
44 S Togi Ritonga, “Wujudkan Pemekaran, Drs Bachrum Harahap Pantas Pimpin Paluta 
(Bagian I),” Harian Mandiri, 8 September 2008; accessed 11 March 2011. 
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that corresponded to Bachrum’s Angkola Sipirok. Padang Lawas would 
administer not ten sub-districts but seven, and the remaining three would shift 
to the third district, called Barumun Raya under Ongku’s plan.45 These three 
sub-districts were chosen carefully. Two of them, Simangambat and Barumum 
Tengah, held vast tracts of D.L. Sitorus’ palm oil plantations. The third was 
the location of Ongku’s hometown. 
In addition to lobbying national politicians, Ongku campaigned locally 
for his plan. The topic became a subject of heated debate on the streets and in 
the newspapers. One outspoken supporter of Ongku’s plan was Chaidir 
Ritonga, the provincial Golkar functionary who was Golkar’s choice for 
deputy district executive in 2005.46 The final step in Ongku’s campaign was to 
push the revision through Bachrum’s district assembly. 
Ongku’s strategy to accomplish this difficult task was legislative 
misdirection. His supporters in PKS announced in the local press that because 
of the subdivision debate, the assembly was hopelessly behind on its routine 
tasks. They complained that Bachrum was focusing too much on the 
subdivision bill at the expense of his other responsibilities as assembly chair.47 
Their statements set out the justification for calling a special meeting to create 
a new assembly agenda. When Bachrum was away in Jakarta, probably 
sometime in early April 2007, Khoiruddin Siregar, one of the deputy chairs of 
the assembly, called a consulting committee meeting (Panitia Musyawarah) 
that had the authority to set a new agenda. At the meeting, Khoiruddin and the 
                                                            
45 Ibid. 
46 “Intelektual, Mahasiswa Dukung Kab. Induk Di Angkola Sipirok,” Harian Waspada, 26 
March 2007. 
47 S Togi Ritonga, “Wujudkan Pemekaran, Drs Bachrum Harahap Pantas Pimpin Paluta 
(Bagian II),” Harian Mandiri, 17 September 2008; accessed 11 March 2011. 
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PKS assembly members inserted the revised proposal into the agenda by a 
vote of 12 to 9.48 
On Friday, 20 April 2007, the assembly met to discuss the proposed 
revision. Bachrum and the other Golkar assembly members were furious. 
Hundreds of protesters assembled outside, but violence broke out inside the 
assembly chambers. Before the meeting was called to order, Syarifuddin 
Hasibuan of Golkar punched Edi Hasan Nasution of PKS in the face. 
Syarifuddin overturned tables, shattered glass and broke ashtrays. His actions 
made the chambers unusable, and the session transferred to the conference 
room at the district executive’s office. Under tight security, 26 out of 45 
assembly members attended. Khoiruddin presided; Bachrum and many of his 
supporters were absent.49 
The attending assembly members settled the matter the same day in a 
marathon session. They established a special committee to discuss the 
revision, which recommended approval by a vote of 13 to 6. All six Golkar 
members on the committee voted against. The assembly immediately put the 
committee’s recommendation to a vote. It passed Ongku’s revision and 
declared all previous subdivision plans null and void. By the end of the day, 
the revised bill was on its way to the Governor’s office in Medan. He 
promptly approved it and by Tuesday, 24 April 2007, it had been forwarded to 
                                                            
48 “Usulan Pemekaran Tapsel Direvisi,” Harian Waspada, 24 April 2007. 
49 “Buk…Bak…Buk, Anggota DPRD Tapsel Baku Hantam,” Harian Sinar Indonesia Baru, 
21 April 2007; “Paripurna Revisi Usulan Pemekaran Tapsel Ricuh, Anggota Dewan Dari PKS 
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the Ministry of Home Affairs which would prepare it for discussion in the 
national assembly in early May.50 
Ongku’s campaign to revise the subdivision bill required a high degree 
of cooperation from all levels of Indonesia’s government. After it passed the 
district assembly, the bill still needed prompt cooperation from the Governor 
and Ministry of Home Affairs to reach the DPR in time for the session 
scheduled to discuss partition bills.51 The speed at which the bill passed 
through the bureaucracy is all the more remarkable when compared to the 
much longer amount time it took Bachrum’s bill to make the same journey.52 
The revision effort was carefully premeditated and widely supported by 
district, provincial and central officials. 
Despite Bachrum’s affiliation to Golkar, the revision received as much 
support from the lawmakers in the DPR as it had from bureaucratic officials. 
The assembly commission responsible for deliberating new districts 
considered both versions of the bill and preferred Ongku’s.53 The draft it 
submitted to the floor of the assembly followed Ongku’s plan but for one 
concession: Bachrum was able to add Simangambat sub-district, which was 
the center of D.L. Sitorus’ palm oil operations, to Padang Lawas Utara, the 
district he would eventually administer.54 
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The defeat of his district subdivision proposal further diminished 
Bachrum’s influence in Tapanuli Selatan. His ally in the assembly, 
Syarifuddin, was sentenced to six months in prison for his violent actions in 
the assembly chambers.55  Padang Lawas Utara was the smallest of the three 
new districts. When Bachrum became district executive there the following 
year, he resigned his position as chair of Tapanuli Selatan’s assembly and 
removed himself from a formal role in district politics. After 2005, he never 
recovered his position as Golkar district chair, although he did become a 
deputy area coordinator for the provincial Golkar board.56 The partition 
controversy confirmed the impression of 2005. Bachrum’s local influence was 
subordinate to the political designs of provincial and central figures. 
 
The Mafia Defeated: The 2010 District Elections 
 The 2010 district elections continued the pattern. In this election, the 
Golkar ticket defeated Bachrum’s son, Andar, again demonstrating the 
superior influence of provincial and central politicians. Andar ran on a ticket 
nominated by PDI-P and a number of smaller parties, while Andar’s 
opponents from Golkar could not have been more similar to his father’s 
opponents in 2005. In 2005, Golkar attempted to nominate Herry Siregar, the 
incumbent deputy executive, and Chaidir Ritonga, a provincial party 
functionary and the son-in-law of a senior Golkar politician. In 2010, Golkar 
nominated Syahrul Pasaribu, a provincial party functionary and the brother of 
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a senior Golkar politician, and Aldinz Rafolo Siregar, the incumbent deputy 
executive.57 
 The Pasaribu family was one of North Sumatra’s most notable political 
families, both during and after the New Order.58 The eldest brother, Bomer, 
served terms as a provincial and national assembly member during the New 
Order, and again as a national assembly member during the post-reform era. 
He was the Minister of Manpower in President Gus Dur’s cabinet.59 A second 
brother, Panusunan, served a term as the district executive of Tapanuli Tengah 
during the late 1990’s.60 When he ran for district executive in Tapanuli Selatan 
in 2010, Syahrul was deputy chair of the Golkar provincial board61 and a 
member of the provincial assembly, where he chaired the Golkar faction.62 A 
younger brother, Gus Irawan, was director of Bank Sumut, North Sumatra’s 
state-owned bank.63 
 Although the brothers spent their early years in Tapanuli Selatan, they 
pursued their careers in Medan and beyond. Syahrul represented not Tapanuli 
Selatan but Simalungun district in the provincial assembly.64 Andar’s 
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campaign attempted to portray this as a weakness and cast Andar as a local 
candidate more deeply attached to the district. One sympathetic newspaper 
headline, for example, proclaimed that the candidates on Andar’s ticket were 
“born here, and they live here.”65 
Syahrul’s campaign team, by contrast, viewed his provincial career as 
an asset and emphasized his connections to Medan and Jakarta. Syahrul 
announced his candidacy with a promise to increase “synergy” between the 
district, provincial and central governments.66 In the months preceding the 
election, Syahrul stood in for Syamsul Arifin, Governor of North Sumatra and 
Golkar’s provincial chair, at district party functions. On 27 April 2010 in 
Padang Sidimpuan, Syahrul inaugurated Golkar’s new leadership board in the 
Governor’s name.67 In February, Syahrul spoke on behalf of the Governor to 
issue a warning to Bachrum that Golkar was ready to discipline him if he 
insisted on supporting Andar’s candidacy in opposition to the official Golkar 
candidate, Syahrul.68 
During the days preceding the election, Syahrul called in his 
connections. His brothers Bomer, Panusunan and Gus Irawan came to 
Tapanuli Selatan to stump on his behalf.69 Chairuman Harahap, one of 
Tapanuli Selatan’s representatives to the national assembly, returned to lend 
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support.70 Chaidir Ritonga, now a deputy chair of the provincial assembly, 
appeared in person throughout the campaign to oppose his old adversary 
Bachrum.71 Syahrul even arranged for a popular Batak singer named Eddy 
Silitonga to travel from Jakarta to perform at campaign events.72 
The machine pursued two strategies, vote-buying and identity appeals, 
to mobilize voters to support Syahrul. According to many accounts, vote-
buying was a primary means of campaigning for many candidates, not just 
Syahrul. One experienced journalist, for example, estimated that 80 percent of 
voters chose candidates who paid them. He believed the going rate for buying 
votes ranged from Rp 30,000 to Rp 100,000 (US$3-US$11).73 Throughout 
Indonesia, the eve of the election is well-known as a time when campaign 
teams hand out cash in key communities in a so-called “attack at dawn” 
(serangan fajar).  In Tapanuli Selatan’s election, the attack was not 
metaphorical. The director of the district development planning agency 
(Badan Perencana Pembangunan Daerah Tapanuli Selatan, Bappeda) and a 
large group of men assaulted Hifzan Lubis, the director of the Bank Sumut 
branch in the neighboring district, Mandailing Natal. The assault occurred at 
the home of Hifzan’s friend in Tapanuli Selatan and was almost certainly 
related to a dispute over the election. Bank Sumut, directed by Gus Irawan, 
was supporting Syahrul’s campaign and on the night before the election it is 
possible that Hifzan was organizing efforts to distribute cash to buy votes. The 
planning agency director supported Ongku and stood to lose his job if Ongku 
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71 “Seribu Massa Antar Syahrul-Aldinz Ke KPUD Tapsel,” Harian Waspada, 12 February 
2010. 
72 “Salam 4, Sarasi di Hati Rakyat Tapsel,” Metro Tabagsel, 7 May 2010. 
73 Personal interview, Padang Sidimpuan, 11 May 2010. 
Tans 75 
 
lost. Although the papers did not report the reason for the incident, it is likely 
that the planning agency director resented the partisanship of Bank Sumut in 
general or, if it was in fact Hifzan’s purpose in Tapanuli Selatan, vote-buying 
activities in particular.74 
The identity appeal that Syahrul and his running mate Aldinz made to 
highland residents around Sipirok town was as important as the vote-buying. 
Throughout the campaign period, Syahrul and Aldinz criticized Ongku for 
failing to transfer the seat of district government from Padang Sidimpuan to 
Sipirok.75 The law partitioning the district stipulated that the move must be 
complete no later than 18 months after the inauguration of the new districts, 
but Ongku failed to meet the deadline because he lacked sufficient funds.76 
Deputy executive Aldinz, whose Siregar clan traditionally originates from 
Sipirok, insisted on complying and opened an office there on 10 February 
2009, the last day before time expired.77 The tactic convinced residents that 
the Golkar ticket would assert Sipirok’s right to seat the government and 
Syahrul polled over 50% there, winning Tapanuli Selatan’s third most 
populous sub-district by a wide margin.78 
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Syahrul decisively won the 2010 district election with 44% of the vote, 
Andar placed second with 35% and Ongku finished with a mere 18%.79 
Whereas in 2005 Bachrum had achieved a draw in a stand-off against senior 
Golkar leadership, in 2010 he was a diminished figure. During the intervening 
five years, Bachrum lost a high-stakes contest over partition, withdrew to 
Padang Lawas Utara and felt his local influence wane. Golkar meanwhile 
conducted highly organized district campaigns throughout North Sumatra. In 
2010 party discipline was much improved and the central leadership hand-
picked many of the candidates.80 The strategy proved effective, and Golkar 
backed winning candidates in 7 out of 20 elections across the province, faring 
especially well in the coastal lowlands.81 
Bachrum’s decline and Golkar’s return to dominance in Tapanuli 
Selatan was illustrated in February 2011 at the party’s annual district planning 
meeting. Syahrul presided over the two day affair at Tapanuli Selatan’s best 
hotel. All of Golkar’s local functionaries were present, including Rahmat 
Nasution, Bachrum’s latest successor as Golkar district chair and chair of the 




79 KPU Sumut, “Daftar Perolehan Suara Calon Kepala Daerah dan Wakil Kepala Daerah 
Kabupaten Kota Se Sumatera Utara Pemilukada Tanggal 12 Mei 2010,” 2010. 
80 Personal interview, Medan, 22 September 2010. 
81 See Appendix. 





Serdang Bedagai: A Machine and Mobilization 
 
 The local politics in Serdang Bedagai is an example of the Golkar 
machine at its strongest, in terms of both political dominance and 
administrative effectiveness. The machine, as personified by a former 
Governor and his younger brother, used gubernatorial power to coerce the 
district bureaucracy, the election commission and plantation estates to support 
its 2005 electoral campaign. In doing so, the brothers defeated a mafia that had 
coalesced a few years previously when Serdang Bedagai was established as a 
new district. The extremely close competition between contenders, coupled 
with the Governor’s untimely death in September 2005, convinced the new 
executive that coercion alone would not sustain a strong administration. He 
undertook to mobilize a broad social coalition by offering patronage to 
potential allies while continuing to practice the strong-arm tactics that put him 
in power. The strategy successfully marginalized the former mafia and 
benefitted a variety of social groups, especially farmers and fisherfolk, that 
local government often ignores. 
 Of the three districts under study, Serdang Bedagai is the closest to 
Medan and the most urban. Because it is connected to the capital by rail as 
well as the Trans-Sumatra Highway, it is well-integrated within provincial 
society. Civil servants and businessmen commute; dense networks connect 
NGO’s and youth groups to their counterparts in Medan. Interaction between 
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Serdang Bedagai and the capital will increase even further if a long-awaited 
expressway is ever completed to cover the short distance of 78 kilometers.1 
 Unlike in Tapanuli Selatan and Labuhan Batu, where single economic 
sectors dominate, Serdang Bedagai has a relatively diversified economy. 
Approximately one-half of its land area is devoted to palm oil and rubber 
cultivation,2 while another one-quarter is rice paddy.3 As a result, in addition 
to its estates production Serdang Bedagai is one North Sumatra’s leading 
producers of rice. Agriculture accounts for 40% of district GDP and 
manufacturing contributes another 20% because of local plants that process 
agricultural products, including palm oil, rubber and fish. Due to the district’s 
semi-urban character, construction, trade, services and real estate are more 
profitable sectors here than in the other two districts.4 Nevertheless, Serdang 
Bedagai’s economic diversity has not been able to match Labuhan Batu’s 
boom, and per capita GDP in Serdang Bedagai remains close to the provincial 
median.5 
 Serdang Bedagai was established as an independent district in 2003 
when it was subdivided from Deli Serdang, the district that surrounds Medan 
municipality. The Sultanate of Serdang, however, had a long history as a 
wealthy ruling house during Dutch colonial times. In 1946, when coups 
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deposed the aristocracy throughout the province, Serdang was exceptional for 
its bloodless and orderly transfer of power to the Republican army.6 The area 
was not so fortunate in 1965-66. Just as elsewhere in the plantation belt, 
suspected communists and labor activists were massacred.7 
 
Erry Nuradi, Machine Boss 
Haji Tengku Erry Nuradi, district executive of Serdang Bedagai, is 
widely regarded as one of the best district executives in North Sumatra, if not 
Indonesia. His first administration, from 2005-2010, won over 125 awards for 
excellence in local government and his integrated business permits office 
became a model for districts throughout the country.8 In recognition of the 
district government’s successful record of local development the Minister of 
Home Affairs selected Serdang Bedagai to host the Department’s celebration 
of Regional Autonomy Day in 2009.9 Erry’s own constituents voted 
overwhelmingly to reelect him in 2010, showing that they also appreciated his 
leadership.  
 Erry has been able to accomplish all of this because he benefits from 
local and provincial support networks. The provincial support was first, and 
Golkar was the focal point for these networks. His entire career Erry had held 
office in Golkar or affiliated organizations in Medan, where he was born, 
                                                            
6 “Reid, “The Blood of the People,” 232-233. 
7 Tsai and Kammen, “Anti-Communist Violence and the Ethnic Chinese in Medan,” 
forthcoming. 
8 “Gubsu Apresiasi Bupati 5 Tahun Memimpin, 125 Penghargaan Berhasil Diraih,” Harian 
Sinar Indonesia Baru, 24 April 2010; “Mendagri Harapkan Seluruh Pemda Miliki Unit Kerja 
Pelayanan Publik Terpadu,” Harian Sinar Indonesia Baru, 14 June 2010. 
9 “Peringatan Hari Otonomi Daerah XIII Tingkat Nasional akan Dilaksanakan di Sergai,” 
Harian Sinar Indonesia Baru, unknown date, April 2009. 
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raised and educated. A businessman, he had long held office in the Indonesian 
Young Businessmen’s Association (Himpunan Pengusaha Muda Indonesia, 
HIPMI), first as general director of the Medan chapter, and then in the same 
position for the provincial organization. He had also served as the provincial 
deputy chair of the national youth committee (Kongres Nasional Pemuda 
Indonesia, KNPI), the national congress for Indonesia’s youth organizations.10 
Finally, when he was elected Serdang Bedagai executive in 2005 Erry was 
serving a term as provincial secretary of Golkar, another Medan based 
office.11 
Even more importantly, his older brother was Governor of North 
Sumatra in 2005 when Serdang Bedagai conducted its first ever district 
election. He aggressively made use of his position to support his younger 
brother’s candidacy. Before he retired to enter politics, Major General Rizal 
Nurdin had a distinguished career in the army. He graduated from the military 
academy (Akademi Militer) in 1971, two years ahead of President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono. Rizal and Susilo followed similar paths through the 
ranks, and following Rizal’s untimely death the President named him a 
national hero.12 Rizal was selected to be Governor of North Sumatra in 1998 
and reelected in 2003, so on Serdang Bedagai’s election day, 27 June 2005, he 
was midway through his second term in office. 
                                                            
10 KPU Sergai, “Daftar Riwayat Hidup,” 2010. 
11 Jaya Arjuna, “Sergai Oleng Diayun Perahu Pilkada,” Media Indonesia, 14 May 2005. 
12 On the collective relationship between Academy classes 1971 and 1973, see Siddharth 
Chandra and Douglas Kammen, “Generating Reforms and Reforming Generations: Military 
Politics in Indonesia’s Democratic Transition and Consolidation,” World Politics 55.1 
(October 2002): 96-136. 
Tans 81 
 
 Erry owed his local networks to Soekirman, his deputy executive. 
Soekirman had long worked as an advocate for farmer’s rights and agricultural 
development in a prominent North Sumatran NGO called BITRA Indonesia 
(Bina Keterampilan Pedesaan Indonesia, Building Rural Skills in Indonesia). 
BITRA had worked extensively in Deli Serdang and Serdang Bedagai over the 
years and had developed a network of farmers, laborers and activists.13  
Once in office, Erry leveraged his party influence to build a local 
coalition. Patronage from the center and the province increased the amount of 
resources at his disposal, and he distributed it through Soekirman’s networks. 
Serdang Bedagai figured prominently in the development schemes of national 
government and non-governmental organizations alike, and various pilot 
projects targeted the district. Erry’s administration often claimed credit for a 
major irrigation project funded by the Japan International Cooperation Agency 
and administered by the central Ministry of Public Works. Erry’s highly 
successful approach to governing Serdang Bedagai district was an example of 
Golkar’s centralized machine expanding its reach from Indonesia’s center to 
the districts, but it also transformed the machine into a mobilizing coalition 
with a wide constituent base. 
 
The Controversial 2005 District Election 
 The partisanship of Governor Rizal was decisive in Serdang Bedagai’s 
2005 district election. Erry was a provincial politician, while his opponents, 
Chairullah and David Purba, originated in a local mafia that had coalesced 
during the campaign to create Serdang Bedagai as a new district. They were 
                                                            
13 Personal interview, Perbaungan, 29 September 2010. 
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well-known and well-funded. With Rizal’s help Erry displaced the more local 
candidates and won a controversial election by a mere 954 votes. The 
unconvincing outcome and Rizal’s death in a plane crash in September 2005 
meant that Erry began his term with a weak mandate and without his most 
important patron. 
 Two years before to the election, Chairullah and David Purba worked 
together in the campaign to separate Serdang Bedagai from the old Deli 
Serdang district. Chairullah publicly supported the campaign from his position 
as district secretary in Deli Serdang. Meanwhile, David Purba chaired the 
Serdang Bedagai district subdivision board (Badan Pemekaran Serdang 
Bedagai) and spent billions of his own rupiah supporting the campaign. He 
was arguably more influential than Chairullah because of his position as local 
leader of the youth organization Pancasila Youth (Pemuda Pancasila). In this 
role, Purba directed a large network of young men who could work on 
construction projects, collect protection payments and demonstrate in the 
streets. The contracts Pemuda Pancasila won made David Purba rich and the 
thugs he commanded made him feared. 
After the creation of Serdang Bedagai in December 2003, Governor 
Rizal named Chairullah the new district’s acting district executive (Penjabat 
Bupati). The new executive’s tasks were to prepare the district for a direct 
election and to construct the offices for a new seat of local government in Sei 
Rampah town.14 His working relationship with David Purba continued when 
Purba won the contract to construct the new district executive offices in Sei 
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Rampah.15 By forming a coalition between the district executive, a powerful 
business contractor and a major youth organization, Chairullah and Purba 
became Serdang Bedagai’s first mafia. 
Though Erry Nuradi was not as well established in Serdang Bedagai as 
Chairullah or David Purba, he was not a newcomer to politics there. In 2004, 
he ran for a provincial assembly seat in North Sumatra’s third district, which 
includes Serdang Bedagai and Tebingtinggi municipality. He received more 
votes in Serdang Bedagai than any of the other dozens of candidates but he did 
not win a seat because his name was listed too low on Golkar’s party list.16 
Similarly, Soekirman had already tested the waters as a politician, first as an 
advisor to Governor Rizal and then as a candidate in 2004 to represent North 
Sumatra in the national legislature (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD).17 In 
Serdang Bedagai, he received the third most votes in a field of 48.18 
 Erry and Soekirman made a formidable ticket, but they nevertheless 
needed help to defeat David Purba and Chairullah. As acting district 
executive, Chairullah had influence over the local bureaucracy and the 
authority to form a new election commission favorable to his candidacy. 
David Purba was very wealthy and directed a local network that Soekirman 
would be hard pressed to match, especially in urban areas. 
                                                            
15 Komisi Pemilihan Umum Serdang Bedagai, “Daftar Riwayat Hidup (Bio Data) Pasangan 
Calon Kepala Daerah dan Wakil Kepala Daerah Kabupaten Serdang Bedagai,” 2010; Vedi 
Hadiz, Localising Power, 108. 
16 Komisi Pemilihan Umum Deli Serdang, “Berita Acara: Rekapitulasi Hasil Penghitungan 
Suara Komisi Pemilihan Umum Kabupaten/Kota untuk Pemilihan Umum Anggota DPRD 
Provinsi,” 21 April 2004. 
17 Hadiz, Localising Power, 111. 
18 KPU Deli Serdang, “Berita Acara Rekapitulasi Hasil Suara Komisi Pemilihan Umum 
Kabupaten/Kota untuk Pemilihan Umum Anggota DPR dan DPD,” 22 April 2004. 
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 Erry and Soekirman’s first lucky break came when Chairullah decided 
to run. First, Chairullah and David Purba competed for similar voters. On 
election day, in sub-districts where David Purba polled well, Chairullah polled 
poorly, and vice versa.19 Second, Chairullah’s decision to stand in the election 
gave Governor Rizal justification to remove him from his position as acting 
district executive and to replace him with a more pliable appointee, Kasim 
Siyo.20 Kasim Siyo’s appointment was important because he, not Chairullah, 
oversaw the formation of Serdang Bedagai’s new election commission and 
made the appointments to fill out the staff of the election commission 
secretariat. The election secretariat supported Erry so fully that the 
commission secretary would ultimately be convicted of manipulating election 
returns and sentenced to two months in prison. 
 Governor Rizal intervened in other ways, too. Before the election, he 
called a meeting with the directors of Serdang Bedagai’s plantations and asked 
them to support his brother Erry. His guests included managers of both private 
and state-owned estates. The Governor wanted them to pressure their workers 
to vote for Erry.21 The effort paid off on election day when two sub-districts 
with extensive rubber and palm oil plantations, Dolok Masihul and Dolok 
Merawan, returned two of Erry’s best sub-district results.22 
 Even with the Governor leaning on the local bureaucracy and local 
businesses to support Erry, the outcome of the election was extremely close. 
                                                            
19 KPU Sergai, “Berita Acara Rekapitulasi Acara Hasil Penghitungan Suara Pemilihan Kepala 
Daerah dan Wakil Kepala Daerah di Tingkat Kabupaten/Kota oleh Komisi Pemilihan Umum 
Daerah Kabupaten/Kota,” 2 July 2005. 
20 “14 Kepala Daerah di Sumut Akan Diganti Pejabat Sementara,” Suara Pembaruan, 26 
February 2005. 
21 Personal interview, Medan, 25 March 2011. 
22 KPU Sergai, “Rekap Hasil Penghitungan Suara Pemilihan Kepala Daerah,” 2005. 
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With 247,265 votes cast, Erry defeated David Purba by only 954 votes; less 
than one-half of one percent of the total.23 The tiny margin alone was cause for 
controversy, but in addition numerous problems flawed the election and 
prompted David Purba’s supporters to accuse Governor Rizal, the election 
commission and Erry of election fraud.24 
 The headline of North Sumatra’s Waspada Daily two days after the 
province-wide round of elections read “Binjai and Serdang Bedagai elections 
flawed.”25 The newspaper criticized the Serdang Bedagai election commission 
because it delayed the release of tabulation data and at the time the edition 
went to press the commission still had not made any announcements regarding 
the outcome. It further reported that confusion over collecting ballots had 
triggered rumors that the election commission was manipulating data. 
 Besides Waspada, the official election monitoring committee 
(Panwaslu) also suspected fraud. In a letter to the election commission, it 
recommended that six villages repeat the polling because of evidence that 
ballot-stuffing affected the results in those villages.26 For his part, David Purba 
appealed the outcome of the election to the state high court in Medan 
(Pengadilan Tinggi).27 
 The vote count was most contentious in Tebingtinggi sub-district, 
where the results were crucial to Erry’s victory. Erry distanced himself from 
David Purba in only three sub-districts. He beat David Purba by 10% and 19% 
                                                            
23 Ibid. 
24 “Mendagri Diprotes Massa Serdang Bedagai,” Suara Karya Online, 29 September 2005; 
accessed 1 April 2011. 
25 “Pilkada Binjai Dan Sergai Tak Mulus,” Harian Waspada, 29 June 2005. 
26 “Mendagri Diprotes Massa Serdang Bedagai,” Suara Karya Online, 29 September 2005; 
accessed 1 April 2011. 
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respectively in Dolok Masihul and Dolok Merawan, two sub-districts with 
extensive estates. In Tebingtinggi, he trounced David Purba by 29%. In 
absolute terms, Erry gained an advantage of 8,931 votes in the sub-district, a 
figure representing 11% of his total for the entire district.28 The data was even 
more unexpected given the demographics of Tebingtinggi. The sub-district 
comprises the immediate hinterlands of Tebingtinggi municipality, so it was 
one of Serdang Bedagai’s most urban and industrialized sub-districts. It 
therefore should have been an area of strength for David Purba, because 
Pemuda Pancasila thrives in urban areas where unemployed youth and 
commercial activity are concentrated. For example, Purba polled best in 
Perbaungan sub-district, another urban area. Five years later, in 2010, another 
Pemuda Pancasila candidate won Tebingtinggi municipality’s mayoral 
election.29 On the other hand, surprising election returns provide 
circumstantial evidence at best and Erry performed well in Tebingtinggi sub-
district in his 2004 bid for a seat on the provincial assembly.30 
Whatever the merits of David Purba’s appeal, the provincial and 
central levels of government endorsed Erry’s victory. On 25 July 2005, the 
state high court in Medan overruled David Purba’s appeal and confirmed 
                                                            
28 KPU Sergai, “Rekap Hasil Penghitungan Suara Pemilihan Kepala Daerah,” 2005. 
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Erry’s victory.31 Shortly after that, the Minister of Home Affairs issued a letter 
formally recognizing the election result.32 
 Official recognition could not quiet the protests, however, especially 
when in August the secretary of the election commission, Lilik, was convicted 
of manipulating election data and sentenced to two months in prison.33 Despite 
the embarrassment of the conviction and the objections of the protesters who 
traveled to Jakarta to demonstrate in front of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the 
state high court refused to reconsider its ruling and Erry began his first term as 
district executive of Serdang Bedagai. 
 To achieve victory in 2005, Erry relied on the support of his older 
brother, Governor Rizal Nurdin. The Governor ensured the local bureaucratic 
administration was supportive of his brother’s candidacy, he pressured local 
plantation businesses to get their employees out to vote and in all likelihood he 
authorized election fraud. 
 On 6 September 2005, Rizal Nurdin died in an airplane crash on his 
way to a meeting in Jakarta with the President and Indonesia’s other 
governors.34 The Governor’s death deprived Erry of his most important patron 
at a time when he was embroiled in controversy. His reputation and legitimacy 
were damaged after Lilik was convicted of manipulating election data. He 
took office amid protests from the supporters of his campaign opponents. 
Although the election had been decided, David Purba would continue to be a 
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formidable opponent that Erry would have to face without the backing of his 
powerful brother. 
 
From Provincial Backing to a Local Coalition 
 When Erry began his first term, he was an outsider to Serdang 
Bedagai’s local politics who had drawn on his connections at the provincial 
level to achieve victory at the district level. Over the course of the term, 
however, Erry systematically constructed a broad local coalition so that when 
he stood for reelection in 2010 he no longer depended on outside help. His 
local support was so unchallenged in 2010 that Erry won by the widest margin 
of any of North Sumatra’s 20 district elections. Erry and Soekirman won 56% 
of the vote and defeated Chairullah’s and David Purba’s combined ticket by a 
margin of 30%.35 
Erry constructed the local coalition in three ways. He cultivated allies 
out of four groups from civil society: business, farmers, the press and NGO’s; 
he consolidated his influence over four formal institutions of the state already 
predisposed to support him: the bureaucracy, the election commission, Golkar 
and the district assembly; and he attacked his opponents (namely David Purba, 
Chairullah and an activist named Jhonni Sitompul) with legal prosecution and 
bureaucratic reassignments. In pursuing these tactics, Erry deployed his 
influence at the provincial and central levels of government to obtain extra 
resources and leverage, but he also leaned heavily on the local connections of 
his deputy Soekirman. 
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Reaching out to civil society 
 Erry’s administration endeared itself to business in two ways. First, it 
enacted policies that reduced bureaucratic red-tape for business and avoided 
gratuitous local taxes and fees. In 2006, Erry established North Sumatra’s first 
integrated business permits office to streamline the regulatory process in the 
district. The office issued all business-related permits, collected local user 
fees, and acted as the local government’s liaison with businesses operating in 
the district. The program gained national attention for its progress toward 
making business regulation easier for business, more transparent and more 
accountable.36 In addition, unlike many other districts in North Sumatra, under 
Erry Serdang Bedagai passed few local regulations, taxes or user fees that the 
Ministry of Home Affairs voided because they contradicted national policy 
aimed at encouraging investment.37 
 Second, Erry’s approach to tendering projects materially benefited 
local business. Erry preferred to tender many small projects as opposed to a 
few large, high-prestige projects.38 During his first term, for example, Erry 
constructed 29 new schools, including 11 high schools, throughout Serdang 
Bedagai.39 He built 76 new health clinics of varying sizes.40 With the 
exception of a new hospital and a new district assembly building, the high 
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schools were Erry’s most high-value tenders. The model meant that Erry 
tendered a large number of projects with short completion times and budget 
allocations turned over to new projects every year. In other words, local 
businesses benefited from frequent opportunities to win government tenders. 
As a result, few local businessmen criticized Erry’s administration, publicly or 
privately. Erry was able to direct projects to his favorite contractors, one of 
whom is his brother-in-law, Azmi Yuli Sitorus, and still tender enough 
contracts to keep everyone else in business, too.41 
 Erry’s first administration reached out to peasant farmers through 
deputy executive Soekirman’s local connections and Erry’s provincial and 
national ones. While in office, Soekirman repeatedly met with farmers. In 
2006, for example, he received a delegation of 1,000 farmers and agreed in 
principle with their opposition to imported rice.42 In 2008, he delivered the 
opening address at the inaugural congress of the Serdang Bedagai peasant 
farmer’s association (Serikat Petani Serdang Bedagai).43 Erry used his 
influence with the provincial and central government to procure extra 
assistance for Serdang Bedagai’s farmers and fisherman. In 2008, the district 
received provincial earmarks to stabilize the price of corn44 and to establish a 
pilot program for green mussel farming.45 In 2009, the central department of 
ocean fisheries (Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan) selected Serdang 
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Bedagai as a recipient of special funds to support fishing cooperatives.46 
Erry’s influence also helped the district promote these efforts. In 2008 and 
2009, the President of Indonesia named Serdang Bedagai the winner of 
consecutive food production awards, honors about which the district 
government tirelessly reminded voters.47 
 The signature farming project of Erry’s first term began before 
Serdang Bedagai existed as a district, but that has not discouraged Erry from 
taking credit for it. In 2003, the Indonesian Ministry of Public Works began 
rehabilitating the Ular River irrigation system with funding provided by a loan 
from the Japanese International Cooperation Agency.48  The project was 
nearing completion in 2010 and the district administration boasted to voters 
that it would provide irrigation to 18,500 hectares of rice paddy.49 
 For those villagers unconvinced by the administration’s various farm-
friendly projects, Erry offered a more tangible sign of support in the year 
preceding the election. In 2009, Erry rewarded every village chief in Serdang 
Bedagai an official motorbike for conducting village business.50 No doubt 
Erry hoped that these influential community leaders would remember the gifts 
during the 2010 election campaign. 
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 Finally, Erry cultivated alliances with influential activists in NGO’s 
and the local press. Soekirman was the bridge to the NGO community. In 
2006 the administration solicited input from Soekirman’s former organization, 
BITRA, when it was developing the integrated business permits office.51 
Soekirman frequently made public appearances with BITRA and other 
NGO’s, such as during the festivities to mark World Food Day 2010 when 
Soekirman participated in a public dialogue with a district assembly member, 
the director of BITRA and the chair of a state-sponsored farmer’s association 
(Gapoktan, Gabungan Kelompok Tani).52 
 Erry’s administration reached out to journalists primarily through its 
public relations division (Bagian Hubungan Masyarakat). The office hosted 
journalists at the executive offices and distributed high quality press releases 
that made their jobs much easier. Many of these releases appeared verbatim in 
local newspapers.53 On occasion, Erry personally met journalists and asked 
them to temper criticism. He did this on several occasions with Jhonni 
Sitompul.54 
 
Consolidating control over state institutions 
 While Erry courted allies in civil society, he tightened his grip on 
Serdang Bedagai’s formal state institutions: the bureaucracy, the election 
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commission, political parties and the district assembly. As a result of 
Governor Rizal’s intervention, Erry began his administration with the 
bureaucracy and election commission already sympathetic to him. Erry 
carefully nurtured this partisanship. He made bureaucratic appointments based 
on personal loyalty, not political considerations, and brought much of his staff 
with him from Medan.55 Erry showed how highly he valued personal loyalty 
with his first appointment to district secretary, the district’s top bureaucrat. 
Many local observers expected him to reward Aliman Siregar, an important 
campaign supporter in 2005, with an appointment as district secretary. It was 
rumored that the two had made a quid pro quo agreement to exchange support 
for the appointment. When he made the selection, however, Erry passed over 
Aliman in favor of Nasrun Husin Lubis.56 
 In his efforts to maintain the favor of the election commission, Erry 
made a rare miscalculation. The resulting scandal cost two of Erry’s allies in 
the commission their jobs, but nevertheless a third Erry ally ultimately became 
the new commission chairperson. Erry provoked outrage during the fasting 
month in 2009 when he paid for three commission members to take the umroh 
pilgrammage to Mecca.57 While the members were still abroad, the local press 
picked up the story, and the national press quickly followed suit. The 
provincial election commission denounced the gift and reported it to the ethics 
council (Dewan Kehormatan).58 The resulting scrutiny revealed further 
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irregularities and two of the pilgrims plus one other commission member were 
ultimately sacked for accepting bribes during the 2009 general elections.59 The 
ethics council also recommended that the third pilgrim, Syarianto, be removed 
from the commission for accepting Erry’s gift.60 The recommendation was not 
accepted, however, and Syarianto retained his position because he was not 
implicated for taking bribes.61 In the reorganized election commission, the five 
members elected Syarianto as the new commission chair and Erry’s links to 
the commission weathered the scandal damaged but intact. 
 Unlike many other district executives, Erry never faced a hostile 
district assembly. From his first day in office, Erry’s influence within Golkar 
extended to the assembly. During 2004 to 2009, Golkar controlled 10 seats in 
the assembly, one more than rival PDI-P. The remaining 26 seats were divided 
among 12 other parties.62 M. Yusuf Basrun chaired both the local Golkar 
chapter and the assembly, while Erry maintained a leadership position within 
the party as regional coordinator for the provincial board (Ketua Koordinator 
Daerah II).63 Erry thus indirectly supervised the largest faction in the 
assembly. When Basrun’s term as district party chair ended in 2010, Erry 
succeeded him, further solidifying his grip on Golkar locally.64 After the 2009 
general elections, Erry’s dominance over the district assembly became even 
more pronounced. Two of Erry’s closest cronies won assembly seats 
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61 Personal interview, Perbaungan, 29 September 2010. 
62 BPS Sergai, “Serdang Bedagai in Figures 2006,” Table 2.2.1, 2006. 
63 “Ribuan Massa Golkar Padati Lapangan Segi Tiga Perbaungan,” Ini Medan Bung, 27 March 
2009; accessed 1 August 2011. 
64 “HT Erry Nuradi Pimpin Partai Golkar Sergai,” Harian Waspada, 17 February 2010. 
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representing two different parties. Azmi Yuli Sitorus, Erry’s brother-in-law, 
became the chair of the Demokrat faction which controlled 7 seats, while 
Usman Sitorus chaired the PPP faction and 5 seats. Between Golkar, with 6 




 Erry harrassed political opponents as skillfully as he built alliances and 
deepened his control over political organizations. Erry typically pursued two 
lines of attack: he undermined rivals’ livelihoods and he brought them to 
court. In both respects he frequently exercised his provincial and central 
influence. During his first term in Serdang Bedagai, Erry used this one-two 
combination against his old rivals David Purba, Chairullah and a vocal critic 
named Jhonni Sitompul. 
David Purba was Erry’s most threatening rival because he controlled 
Pemuda Pancasila, its contracting business and its street muscle. In 2008, Erry 
used his provincial level influence to force David Purba out of Pemuda 
Pancasila. In that year, Erry became a member of the advisory council to the 
North Sumatra provincial leadership of Pemuda Pancasila.66 That same year, 
after 20 years of holding office in Pemuda Pancasila, David Purba failed to 
win reelection as the chair of the Serdang Bedagai chapter of the organization. 
In 2010, when David Purba again ran for political office in Serdang Bedagai, 
                                                            
65 Personal interview, Tebing Tinggi, 11 October 2010; “Keputusan Gubernur Sumatera Utara 
No: 170/4087.K/Tahun 2009, Tanggal 12 Oktober 2009: Pengangkatan Anggota DPRD 
Kabupaten Sergai Periode 2009 – 2014,” reprinted in Bulletin Serdang Bedagai, Edition XXI 
September – October 2009. 
66 KPU Sergai, “Daftar Riwayat Hidup,” 2010. 
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he no longer held a position in Pemuda Pancasila, and had struck up an 
unlikely alliance with the traditionalist Islamic organization, Nadhlatul 
Ulama.67 
Though Erry attacked David Purba’s career, it was no personal 
vendetta. Erry needed to secure the support of Serdang Bedagai’s youth 
groups to bolster his growing local coalition. In 2007, Erry acquired a national 
level position in the Communication Forum for the Sons and Daughters of 
Veterans (Forum Komunikasi Putra Putri Purnawirawan dan Putra Putri TNI 
POLRI), another powerful youth group and Pemuda Pancasila’s rival.68 In 
March 2010, his maneuvering paid off locally when the Serdang Bedagai 
branch of the national youth congress (KNPI) endorsed his candidacy by 
awarding him a token of appreciation and affirming him as a leader for the 
district’s youth.69 
Just as he interfered in David Purba’s career, Erry attacked the 
livelihoods of Chairullah and Jhonni Sitompul. Since Governor Rizal removed 
him from his position as acting district executive of Serdang Bedagai, 
Chairullah has not received a promotion. For six years his career has been 
stalled in an unimportant position in a bureaucratic backwater, the provincial 
board for national unity and community protection (Badan Kesatuan Bangsa 
dan Perlindungan Masyarakat).70 Erry used his authority to reassign civil 
servants to harass Jhonni Sitompul’s wife. Jhonni’s wife worked for years as a 
                                                            
67 Majelis Pimpinan Wilayah, Pemuda Pancasila Sumatera Utara, “Kantor Ranting – Cabang 
Kabupaten Serdang Bedagai,” no date; accessed at www.ppsumut.com/cabang/?id=21, 8 April 
2011. 
68 Ibid. 
69 “Rapat Paripurna DPD KNPI Tetapkan HT Erry Nuradi Sebagai Tokoh Pemersatu 
Pemuda,” Harian Sinar Indonesia Baru, 9 March 2010. 
70 KPU Sergai, “Daftar Riwayat Hidup,” 2010. 
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midwife in the important district town of Pasar Bengkel. Her position included 
an official house as a perquisite, and Jhonni’s family lived there. In 2010, Erry 
reassigned Jhonni’s wife to a health clinic in the remote sub-district Silinda. 
As a result, Jhonni’s family lost their house.71 
In the case of each of these three political opponents, Erry brought 
them to court in addition to attacking their livelihoods. In 2004, while 
Chairullah was still acting district executive in Serdang Bedagai, Governor 
Rizal’s provincial attorney general initiated a corruption investigation against 
him for crimes he allegedly committed while still district secretary of Deli 
Serdang.72 After Governor Rizal’s death, the investigation proceeded slowly 
but steadily and in 2007 the state court in Lubukpakam, Deli Serdang, 
convicted Chairullah of corruption and sentenced him to eighteen months 
imprisonment. The following year, the North Sumatra high court upheld the 
decision and added six months to the sentence. Chairullah again appealed the 
decision, but in August 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the high court’s 
decision.73 In addition to this long-running case, in March 2010 a central anti-
corruption commission (KPK) investigation team questioned the beleaguered 
Chairullah about his actions as acting district executive of Serdang Bedagai. 
The investigation, which took place only two months before the district 
election, targeted both Chairullah and David Purba because of a reforestation 
tender Chairullah’s administration awarded to David Purba in 2005.74 
                                                            
71 Personal interview, Tebing Tinggi, 23 September 2010. 
72 Hambali Batubara and Bambang Soed, “Bupati Serdang Tersangka Korupsi,” Tempo 
Interaktif, 15 December 2004; accessed 15 April 2011. 
73 “Kasasi Terdakwa Korupsi Ditolak, Mantan Sekdakab DS Dibui 2 Tahun,” Pos Metro 
Medan, 14 January 2011. 




In September 2009, the Medan police arrested David Purba on charges 
of fraud valued at 200 million Rupiah, or US$20,000. The prosecution witness 
was a business associate of David’s who had lent him the money in 2007. The 
project for which David borrowed the money fell through, and he never 
returned the money.75 The case was tried in the Medan state court in June 
2010, just a month after the election, and David Purba was eventually 
sentenced to six months in prison and twelve months probation.76 Rumors in 
Serdang Bedagai allege that someone, presumably associated with Erry, 
offered to pay the witness an amount equal to David’s debt if he agreed to 
testify against David in court.77 
Jhonni Sitompul was involved in an altercation with two security 
guards at the district revenue office (Pendapatan Pengelolaan Keuangan dan 
Asset Daerah) in August 2009. Both sides accused the other of assault and 
reported the incident to the local police, and both cases were tried in the 
Tebingtinggi state court in February 2010.78 Jhonni was sentenced to 
probation, while the security guards were sentenced to four and eight months 
in prison.79 
It is unlikely that three of Erry’s most important opponents all faced 
legal prosecution during the 2010 campaign period by coincidence. Erry made 
                                                            
75 Ridin, “Poltabes Medan kembali panggil OK David Purba,” Waspada Online, 3 March 
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the most of his opponents’ indiscretions and prosecuted them when the 
opportunity arose. These three cases demonstrate the impressive reach of 
Erry’s influence within the justice system. Chairullah’s case originated in the 
Lubukpakam state court and the appeals process reached the Supreme Court. 
David Purba was tried in the Medan state court, and Jhonni Sitompul in the 
Tebingtinggi state court. Different public prosecutors from different local 
administrations handled each case. Even the KPK visited from Jakarta to 
investigate both of Erry’s electoral opponents just two months before the 
district election. Regardless of the prosecutor and venue, each case returned a 




During his first term in office, Erry constructed a broad local coalition 
of support that included local business, farmers, NGO activists, the 
bureaucracy, the election commission, the district assembly and parts of the 
youth groups. He undermined the livelihoods and secured criminal convictions 
of his chief rivals. He accomplished these things by utilizing party and 
personal networks to direct patronage to his allies and to apply coercive 
pressure to his opponents. In 2005, Erry was an outsider who took office amid 
protests after a flawed election. In 2010, his local coalition reelected him by 
the largest winning margin of any candidate in North Sumatra in 2010. Erry 





Conclusion: Mafias and Machines in North Sumatra 
 
This thesis argues that at least three types of coalitions contend for 
power at the local level in Indonesia. These coalitions amass political strength 
from the set of institutions that fall under their control. These institutions, and 
the resources they command, explain and constrain the strategies each 
coalition pursues in contests for power. In Labuhan Batu, Tapanuli Selatan 
and Serdang Bedagai districts, the most consequential institutions were 1) the 
local state apparatus, 2) party organizations which have the ability to override 
the provincial bureaucracy and 3) social networks with the potential to 
mobilize popular constituencies. In those districts, mafias based within the 
local state contended against a Golkar machine which dominated provincial 
government. In some cases, popular constituencies contributed decisive 
support to either mafias or machines when they were incorporated into 
mobilizing coalitions. These contests featured money, coercion and popular 
mobilization to the degree that each coalition could summon such resources. 
How representative of the rest of Indonesia is this pattern of contention among 
coalitions? 
The thesis hypothesizes that similar elite coalitions will coalesce in 
other districts to the extent that similar sources of power, namely local state 
spoils, party organizations and strong social networks, are available to elites. It 
asserts that this is most likely to be the case in Outer Island districts that 
neither benefit from significant oil, gas or mineral revenues nor enjoy special 
autonomous status. While a full survey of Indonesia’s districts is beyond the 
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scope of the thesis, this conclusion situates the three case studies within the 
larger field of cases in North Sumatra, where 20 districts (excluding those on 
Nias Island) have conducted local elections since the beginning of 2010. In 
doing so, it tests the hypothesis against the outcomes of these elections. Two 
final sections consider the implications for decentralized government and 
democratic elections, respectively, in North Sumatra. 
 
The 2010 Local Elections in North Sumatra 
Within North Sumatra, the approach is widely applicable. Mafias and 
machines are discernable in many, though not all, districts and broadly 
conform to the following geographic pattern of distribution: a Golkar machine 
predominated on the coasts, incumbent mafias were most successful in the 
highland interior and palm oil-funded challengers captured office in booming 
plantation districts. Mobilizing coalitions are more difficult to detect on the 
basis of a brief survey of election results, but plantation districts are likely 
candidates. An overview of the North Sumatra 2010 local elections is 
presented in the Appendix. 
Golkar has successfully established a machine in North Sumatra, while 
PDI-P and Demokrat have not, primarily because of its control over the 
Governor’s office. The Governor’s attorney general (Jaksa Agung) applies 
coercive force by prosecuting Golkar’s political opponents, while the 
Governor’s power over the provincial bureaucracy confers access to 
patronage. In addition, over the last three legislative elections, Golkar has 
maintained a consistent district and provincial legislative presence while PDI-
P’s and Demokrat’s legislative shares have ebbed and flowed. Finally, 
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Golkar’s central board campaigned aggressively on behalf of its local 
candidates in 2010. In other provinces, however, Golkar may not enjoy such a 
privileged position. PDI-P, Demokrat or any other party might build a rival 
machine if it can link local and provincial power as Golkar has done in North 
Sumatra. 
In both the eastern and western coastal lowlands of North Sumatra, 
representatives of the Golkar machine replaced mafias that had held power for 
two terms. The outgoing incumbents, precluded from running for office by the 
two-term limit, advanced proxy candidates to succeed them in three districts 
and four cities. Only two proxies were elected, however, demonstrating the 
instability of local mafias. Instead, Golkar’s machine dominated. Party-
supported candidates took office in three districts and two cities, including 
Medan, Asahan and Serdang Bedagai, three of the four most populous 
bailiwicks conducting elections.1 
Among lowland districts, Sibolga municipality deserves special 
mention because the incumbent mafia accommodated, rather than opposed, 
Golkar. Sahat Panggabean, the outgoing mayor, paired his son-in-law as the 
deputy candidate with Syarfi Hutauruk, a Golkar representative to the national 
assembly (DPR). Even though Golkar formally nominated another candidate, 
Syarfi attracted the support of many local party activists who were ultimately 
dismissed from the party.2 In this way, the incumbent mafia simultaneously 
undermined party support for its opponent and ingratiated itself with Golkar 
                                                            
1 Simalungun is the second most populous North Sumatra district to conduct elections in 2010. 
2 “Golkar Sibolga Pecat 21 Kader,” Harian Waspada, 10 May 2010. 
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networks at the municipal and national levels. Sibolga thus exemplified a local 
mafia that held onto power by aligning itself with a party machine. 
In the highlands, mafias outperformed Golkar but both did badly. 
Three incumbent mafias were reelected in campaigns marred by violence. In 
Humbang Hasundutan and Samosir, the opposition violently protested 
perceived irregularities while in Pakpak Bharat the major candidates 
intimidated opponents and voters alike.3 In four other interior districts 
incumbent candidates lost reelection campaigns, once again underscoring 
mafia instability. Golkar fared even worse, supporting only two winning 
candidates. 
In elections where incumbents and Golkar both lost, many palm oil 
candidates won. The sons of plantation tycoons won in Mandailing Natal 
district and Pematang Siantar municipality, and in all three Labuhan Batu 
districts the winning candidates campaigned with the financial backing of 
palm oil planters. The campaigns of aspiring palm oil mafias involved varying 
degrees of organization. In all likelihood they bought many votes, but some, 
such as in Labuhan Batu, also mobilized popular constituencies. 
 What explains geographic variation within North Sumatra among the 
types of dominant elite coalitions? While a complete explanation would 
require further research, the analysis presented in the thesis suggests a likely 
hypothesis. In accordance with the argument that party machines possess 
coercive and material advantages over local mafias, a machine dominated 
North Sumatra’s most populous and strategic bailiwicks. A combination of 
                                                            




judicial prosecutions, vote buying, patronage and popular mobilizing swept 
Golkar candidates to victory in nearly every district and city around Medan. 
These districts command North Sumatra’s economy and will have the greatest 
impact on the 2014 general elections. Although it is possible that infighting 
crippled Golkar in the sparsely populated highlands, it is more likely that 
Golkar simply had less interest in these districts and conceded them to the 
incumbents. In plantation districts, finally, aspiring mafias enjoy the benefits 
of global demand for palm oil. Windfall profits have made local plantation 
owners uniquely influential and tipped the balance of power in favor of palm 
oil-led coalitions. 
The pattern of variation is invisible to those who do not disaggregate 
the category of “New Order elites.” In North Sumatra, every type of successful 
coalition has demonstrable links to the previous regime. Mafias include career 
bureaucrats who served in Suharto’s bureaucracy, local business contractors 
with a lifetime of work history during the New Order and youth group leaders 
who started out as paramilitaries fostered by Suharto’s armed forces 
(Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia).4 Golkar was the regime’s party 
and the umbrella for many of its corporatist organizations. Today’s plantation 
tycoons grew rich because of land concessions granted during the New Order. 
Even social mobilization, to the extent that it is organized by youth groups, as 
it was in Labuhan Batu, is linked to the New Order. As long as the post-reform 
era is less than a lifetime removed from the fall of Suharto, the political elite 
will be products of the New Order because they lived at a time when the 
                                                            




regime encompassed Indonesia’s political, economic and social life.5 
Accordingly, the variation documented in the thesis is fully consistent with the 
work that demonstrates continuity between the New Order and post-reform 
eras.6 However, emphasizing continuity risks overlooking the considerable 
variation in and between the types of coalitions that are engaged in local 
politics. 
 
Countering Decentralization Reform 
Viewed from a purely local perspective, it appears that mafias must 
expand or perish. The potential of the local state apparatus to generate 
patronage resources is too limited to satisfy both the expectations of coalition 
members and the demands of election campaigning. In the 2010 elections, 
incumbents performed dismally when they limited their coalitions to 
bureaucratic officials, assembly members and business contractors—that is, 
strictly to the members of a local mafia. The pressures imposed by direct 
elections destabilized mafias everywhere except in the highlands, and even 
there violence marred their reelection campaigns. The most successful mafias 
expanded their coalitions by mobilizing popular constituencies, like the 
challenger in Labuhan Batu, or by accommodating machines, like the 
incumbent in Sibolga. The implication is that unless they are unopposed 
mafias cannot muster a minimum winning coalition.7 
                                                            
5 Elites who were excluded from power during the New Order, such as labor organizers and 
traditional ethnic leaders, are exceptions to this generalization. 
6 See, for example, Hadiz, Localising Power; Schulte Nordholt, “Renegotiating Boundaries;” 
and Buehler, “Decentralisation and Local Democracy.” 
7 For a brief introduction to minimum winning coalitions, see Richard Doner, Bryan Ritchie 
and Dan Slater, “Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of Developmental States: Northeast 
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Factors beyond the district, however, constrain mafia capacity to 
incorporate wider constituencies. In particular, central efforts to curtail what 
have been depicted as the excessive dangers of decentralization are 
increasingly undermining the ability of mafias to generate patronage and 
outspend opponents. As early as 2002, the Megawati administration was 
pursuing legislation intended to reestablish central authority to manage natural 
resources and to sanction district governments. For example, the Ministry of 
Forestry regained sole authority over forestry regulation and taxation with 
Government Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah) No. 34/2002 and the 
Ministry of Public Works took back some responsibility for water 
management in Law No. 7/2004.8 President Megawati’s counter-reforms 
culminated with Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Government, which she signed 
just before leaving office. By creating direct local elections and requiring party 
nominations that represent 15% of the electorate, the law reset the electoral 
ground rules.9 The changes inflated campaign costs and placed new strains on 
local mafias. In addition, it took several initial steps toward making districts 
subservient once again to provinces and the center. The law recycled New 
Order jargon by designating governors “the representative of the center to the 
                                                                                                                                                           
and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective,” International Organization 59.2 (Spring, 
2005): 327-361. 
8 McCarthy, “Sold down the river,” 170-171; Jake Ricks, personal communication, 27 April 
2011. 
9 Buehler, “Decentralisation and Local Democracy,” 271. 
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regions,”10 and it curtailed the ability of a district assembly to impeach its 
executive while granting the central government unilateral power to do so.11 
The Yudhoyono administration extended Megawati’s recentralization 
agenda. Law No. 28/2009, for example, established a closed-list of allowable 
local taxes, effectively dictating tax legislation to the districts.12 Government 
Regulation 19/2010 empowered governors by granting them unspecified 
powers to reward and punish district executives.13 Finally, in 2010 the 
administration was considering a radical revision to Law No. 32/2004 that 
would give governors extensive powers over the districts, including sole 
responsibility to appoint, promote and reassign local civil servants.14 
The new legislation, combined with the shortcomings of mafias, 
created the opportunity for national parties to step in to local government, 
replacing mafias. In North Sumatra, Golkar is the party which has done the 
most to take advantage, and its candidates have replaced local mafias in at 
least seven North Sumatran districts and cities since 2005: Medan, Serdang 
Bedagai, Asahan, Tanjung Balai, Tapanuli Selatan, Tapanuli Tengah and 
Sibolga. Less than ten years after reforms took effect, counter-reform has 
restored the advantage to centralized parties in contests over control of the 
regions, at least in North Sumatra. 
                                                            
10 Eko Ari Wibowo, “Kewenangan Gubernur Akan Diperkuat,” Tempo Interaktif, 29 October 
2009; accessed 29 August 2010; Cecep Effendi, “Decentralization: Defining the role of 
provincial governors,” The Jakarta Post, 17 July 2008; and Hadiz, Localising Power, 79-80. 
On New Order use of the phrase, see Malley, “Regions: Centralization and Resistance,” 79. 
11 Buehler, “Decentralisation and Local Democracy,” 279; Schulte Nordholt and van Klinken, 
“Introduction,” in Renegotiating Boundaries: 14-15. 
12 To be fair, the central government also promised the law would increase local tax revenues. 
Hariatni Novitasari, “Implikasi Pemberlakuan UU No 28/2009 tentang Pajak Daerah dan 
Retribusi Daerah,” Jawa Pos, 23 November 2009. 
13 Redhi Setiadi, “Penguatan Peran Gubernur lewat PP 19/2010,” Jawa Pos, 16 March 2010. 




Defeat at the polls combined with the widespread criticism of “little 
kings” puts local politicians in a very weak position to resist counter-reforms. 
Meanwhile, the Yudhoyono administration presses the advantage by 
campaigning for additional recentralizing measures. A key example is the 
proposal to abolish direct gubernatorial elections. Some national figures have 
advocated a return to holding indirect elections in provincial assemblies, while 
others prefer presidential appointments.15 Regardless of its specific form, the 
proposed change would further disadvantage locally-based politicians. 
Considering the advantages that machines already enjoy because of their 
access to provincial budgets and bureaucracies, placing the selection of 
governors in the hands of the parties would greatly increase their hegemony 
over local politics. 
Two issues particularly important to local politicians in North Sumatra, 
plantation revenue sharing and forest reclassification, illustrate the 
consequences of recentralization. North Sumatran politicians lack leverage to 
push legislation at the national level. Since the 1990’s, successive governors 
have lobbied the central government to return a share of the vast plantation 
revenues generated in North Sumatra to the province.16 It is not surprising that 
during the New Order the plea was ignored. But in 2006, sixteen Governors of 
plantation-rich provinces signed a letter to the President requesting 25 percent 
ownership of the state-owned estates and an 80% share of the export taxes 
                                                            
15 “Gubernur Dipilih DPRD Untungkan Incumbent,” Harian Medan Bisnis, 13 December 
2010; Redhi, “Penguatan Peran Gubernur lewat PP 19/2010,” Jawa Pos, 16 March 2010. 
16 Siti Amelia, “Harus Cerdik Tuntut DPHP,” Seputar Indonesia, 26 June 2011. 
Tans 110 
 
levied on their products.17 Despite initially promising to act on the request, to 
date President Yudhoyono has not, preferring instead to maintain central 
control over the lucrative revenues.18 North Sumatra has been similarly 
helpless promoting provincial forest reclassification. In 2005, the Ministry of 
Forestry issued a decree letter (Surat Keputusan, SK Menhut No. 44/2005) 
fixing the province’s forest boundaries at 3,742,120 Ha, classified into various 
categories.19 The letter elicited widespread consternation because government 
offices and villages alike fell within forest boundaries and lost their legal 
standing.20 The affected districts, in coordination with the provincial 
government, proposed boundary revisions intended to reduce drastically forest 
reserves, presumably in order to maximize logging opportunities and to mask 
illegally logged areas.21 In 2009 the governor submitted a revised and 
weakened proposal to the Ministry, but the central government, emboldened 
by North Sumatra’s internal bickering, responded by dragging its feet.22 On 
both of these important issues, the central government has maintained a strong 
                                                            
17 “16 Provinsi Usulkan Bagi Hasil Sektor Perkebunan Milik Negara,” Suara Pembaruan, 12 
May 2006. 
18 Anang Anas Azhar, “Presiden Didesak Revisi UU No 33/2004: Triliunan Rupiah Hasil 
Perkebunan di Sumut Ditarik Pusat,” Harian Medan Bisnis, 28 Jan 2011. However, the 
revision of Law No. 32/2004 currently under consideration may finally initiate plantation 
revenue sharing. See Effendi and Sjahril, “Reshaping regional autonomy,” The Jakarta Post, 
14 February 2011.   
19 Khaerudin, “Pelepasan Kawasan Hutan di Sumut Belum Tentu Disetujui,” Kompas, 30 June 
2009. 
20 “SK Menhut No. 44/2005 Rugikan Rakyat, Perlu Revisi atau Hapus Total?,” Harian Sinar 
Indonesia Baru, 23 May 2007; Hardi Munthe, “SK Menhut 22/2005 Masih Bermasalah,” 
WALHI Sumatera Utara, Press Release No. 07/PR/WSU/V/07, 20 July 2007; accessed at 
walhisumut.wordpress.com, 12 July 2011. 
21 “Baru Sedikit Kabupaten Ajukan Usul – Revisi SK Menhut No 44/2005,” Kompas, 21 
September 2007; Nora Deliyana Lumbangaol, “Krisis hutan, Gubsu harus bentuk tim 
independen,” Waspada Online, 17 April 2010; accessed 23 August 2010. 
22 “Revisi Kawasan Hutan Sumut Masuk Program 100 Hari Menhut,” Kompas, 18 November 
2009; “Menhut Revisi SK Penunjukan Hutan di Sumut,” Media Indonesia, 25 February 2011. 
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 Paradoxically, counter-reform made the 2010 local elections in North 
Sumatra more competitive than the previous round. Only 7 incumbents or 
proxies won reelection in 2010, compared to 10 in 2005.23 Competition 
increased because recentralizing legislation, such as Law No. 32/2004, 
empowered party machines to displace well-established mafias in many 
districts. Equally important, Golkar largely avoided the pitfalls of internal 
strife. Consequently, the most consequential contests occurred vertically, 
between locally-oriented mafias and centrally-oriented machines, not 
horizontally, between rival factions. 
 The heightened competition increased democratic participation in two 
ways. First, elections presented a meaningful choice to voters, as the 
difference in orientation between local mafias and party machines affects the 
local government’s capacity to distribute patronage as well as its attitude 
toward issues such as plantation revenue sharing and forest reclassification. 
When given a choice voters were able to sanction unpopular incumbents and 
North Sumatrans did not hesitate to do so by rejecting many incumbent 
candidates and their proxies. Second, close competition among contending 
candidates pressured some to mobilize new constituencies in an effort to 
attract more votes. As a result, mafias, machines or both expanded their 
coalitions in some places to include NGO’s, youth groups, farmers’ 
                                                            
23 Author’s personal data, compiled from various sources. 
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associations, local communities and religious associations. Once they join a 
coalition, social organizations expect elites to respond to their concerns and 
distribute patronage to their members. In this way, they involve their 
constituencies in the political process and may, through the threat of 
withdrawing their support, help to hold local governments accountable. 
 If Golkar’s machine continues to dominate local politics in North 
Sumatra, however, intense electoral competition may well prove to have been 
a temporary phenomenon. The year 2010 may signal a shift away from mafias 
and toward the machine, especially if Golkar maintains its current coherence. 
Palm oil mafias, confined to plantation districts and dependent on volatile 
commodity markets, pose a contingent, localized threat to Golkar but do not 
challenge its overall hegemony. If other local mafias continue to decline, and 
current national policy trends suggest that they might, then viable challengers 
may not emerge in 2015 to oppose the provincial machine’s incumbents. 
Under such circumstances, high levels of participation are unlikely to reoccur. 
As Steven Erie argues of urban machines in the United States, once they 
consolidate control over a city, machines limit entry into the coalition and 
access to the patronage rolls.24 Absent the threat of losing power, machines 
have every incentive to expend patronage only to reward tenured members of 
the coalition. 
 It is very difficult to make generalizations about Indonesia’s 
democracy, even those limited in scope to North Sumatra, because it continues 
to change very rapidly. Each round of local elections since the end of the New 
Order has followed a different set of guidelines, with more legal changes 
                                                            
24 Steven Erie, Rainbow’s End, 6-17. 
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likely in store. Accordingly, each round has favored different elites and 
produced different types of governments. Nevertheless, some questions appear 
settled, at least temporarily. Local government in North Sumatra has not been 
taken over by dynastic bosses in the manner of the Philippines. The 2010 
elections, in stark contrast to the Philippines, demonstrated the deficiencies of 
the local state as a source of dynastic political power. Instead, party machines 
relied on provincial power and patronage to seize office in strategic local 
districts, even without previously existing grassroots support. As a result, local 
government in North Sumatra, at least for the next several years, will be 
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Notes to Appendix 
 
                                                            
1 Chart based on author’s personal data, compiled from various sources. 
2 On 28 September 2010, the Constitutional Court (MK, Mahkamah Konstitusi) ordered 
Tanjung Balai to repeat the election in 17 municipal wards because of “systematic money 
politics,” effectively overturning the incumbent’s son’s victory. Golkar’s candidate won in the 
follow-up election on 22 November 2010 (“MK Perintahkan Pilkada Ulang Tanjungbalai,” 
MK Online, 29 September 2010; accessed 13 July 2011). 
3 On 9 June 2010, the Constitutional Court ruled the victorious Golkar candidate ineligible 
because he was still under probation for a previous corruption conviction and ordered Tebing 
Tinggi to repeat the election. The incumbent’s younger brother won the follow-up election on 
28 June 2011 (“MK Perintahkan Pemungutan Suara Ulang Pemiliukada Kota Tebing Tinggi,” 
MK Online, 14 June 2010; accessed 5 July 2011). 
4 Although technically not the incumbent, the victorious candidate was incumbent deputy 
executive and the younger brother of the 2005 election winner, who had died in office. 
5 The Tapanuli Tengah election took place on 12 March 2011. 
6 Although the candidate that Golkar nominated lost, the candidate who won was previously a 
Golkar representative in the national assembly (DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat). 
7 On 6 July 2010, the Constitutional Court ordered Mandailing Natal to repeat its election 
because of “money politics.” The follow-up election took place on 24 April 2011. Hidayat 
Batubara, the son of a plantation tycoon, won both elections (“MK Perintahkan Pemungutan 
Suara Ulang di Mandailing Natal,” Media Indonesia, 7 July 2010). 
